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Many carriers, such as airlines and ocean carriers, collaborate through the formation of alliances. The
detailed alliance design is clearly important for both the stability of the alliance and profitability of the
alliance members. This work is motivated by a real-life liner shipping “resource exchange alliance” agreement
design. We provide an economic motivation for interest in resource exchange alliances and propose a model
and method to design a resource exchange alliance. The model takes into account how the alliance members
compete after a resource exchange by selling substitutable products and thus enables us to obtain insight
into the effect of capacity and the intensity of competition on the extent to which an alliance can provide
greater profit than when in the setting without an alliance. The problem of determining the optimal amounts
of resources to exchange is formulated as a stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints
(SMPECs). We show how to determine whether there exists a unique equilibrium after resource exchange,
how to compute the equilibrium, and how to compute the optimal resource exchange. SMPEC problem,
which is generally very difficult to solve, is well-posed in the paper, and robust results can be obtained with
a reasonable amount of computational effort.
Key words : alliance, resource exchange, pricing, revenue management, stochastic mathematical
programming with equilibrium constraints, non-cooperative game
1. Introduction
Alliances are collaborative agreements made between two or more parties in order to achieve
common goals and to improve competitiveness. Increasingly, alliances are being recognized as a
key component of business strategies and can be found easily in many industries. For example, in
the liner shipping industry, ocean container carriers often make an alliance agreement to provide
joint services. A “service is a cycle of successive port visits that repeats according to a regular
schedule, typically with weekly departures at each port in the cycle. To maintain a schedule of
weekly departures at each port, the headway between successive ships traversing the cycle must
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2be one week. Thus, if it takes a ship n weeks to complete one cycle, then n ships are needed
to offer the service with weekly departures at each port in the cycle. For many services between
Asia and North America and services between Asia and Europe, it takes a ship between 5 and
10 weeks to complete one cycle, and thus several ships are needed to offer the service. Taking into
account that a large container ship can cost a hundred million US dollars1, it becomes clear that
for even the large carriers it would require an enormous investment to introduce a new service.
For this reason, ocean carriers form an alliance. Another example of a widely used alliance can
be found in the airline industry. Airlines often sell tickets on each others’ flights through code
share agreements; an alliance member (the marketing member) can sell tickets for flights operated
by another alliance member (the operating member) and the marketing member can put its own
code on the flight. Code sharing dramatically increases the number of itinerary products that each
airline can sell. Vacation packages provide another example of seller alliances enabling the sale of
products combined from the resources/products of several sellers. For example, a vacation package
may consist of airline tickets for 2 people, a hotel room for 4 nights, and car rental for 5 days.
Computers and peripherals provide another example of products combined from the resources of
several sellers.
Seller alliances can be structured in many different ways. The rules of an alliance are clearly
critical for both the stability of the alliance and the well-being of the alliance members. The major
distinguishing factor between different alliance structures involves the control of the resources
involved. In a so-called “free-sale” or “soft-block” agreement, each alliance member controls the
availability of the resources (such as seat space on flights or container slots on voyages) that it
contributed and other alliance members can buy the resources from the owner and include it in
the products that they sell as long as the owner makes the resources available. Under a “resource-
exchange” or “hard-block” agreement, alliance members exchange resources, and thereafter each
alliance member controls the resources allocated to them as though they were the owners of the
resources.
In the liner shipping industry, the most widely used form of the alliances is the “resource
exchange” type (also called a slot exchange alliance or a cross slot charter alliance). Under the
resource exchange alliance, carriers agree to provide each other a specified amount of capacity
and possibly a specified amount of money in advance of the sales season. For example, carrier
one provides carrier two x1 slots on each of its voyages on its service and carrier two provides
carrier one x2 slots on each of its voyages on its service. Thereafter each carrier can make bookings
for itineraries that include voyages operated by both carriers, thereby dramatically increasing the
1 e.g.,http://www.emma-maersk.com/specification/
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number of itinerary products that each carrier can sell. Suppose the carrier one operates a service
with the cycle of port visits A,B,C,A, and carrier two operates a service with the cycle of port
visits A,D,E,A. If a customer wants to send a container from port C to port D via port A and
there is no alliance between the carriers, then the customer should make a booking with carrier one
to send the container from C to A and a separate booking with carrier two to send the container
from A to D. However, after the slot exchange agreement, each carrier can offer the customer a
complete booking from D via A to G and controls the pricing for such products as they control
the pricing for all their other products. A real-life example of such an alliance can be found in the
Hanjin-Evergreen Agreement2, in which Hanjin operated a service that visits New York, Norfolk,
Savannah, Rio Grande, Itajai, and Santos, and Evergreen operated a service that visits Shanghai,
Ningbo, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong, Yantian, Singapore, Durban, Cape Town, Montevideo, Buenos
Aires, and Santos. Evergreen provided Hanjin with 100 Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) slots
on each voyage of its service and Hanjin provided Evergreen with 137 TEU slots on each voyage
of its service. Thus, if a customer wants to send a container from Cape Town to Rio Grande,
then with the alliance the customer can book a single itinerary from Cape Town to Rio Grande
via Santos with either carrier, whereas without an alliance the customer would have to make two
separate bookings. In fact, this type of alliances are very common in practice and other similar
examples of such alliance agreements can be found easily3.
The ocean container carriers also enter into a resource exchange alliance when they introduce
new joint services. As described earlier, services repeat according to a regular schedule and in order
to offer weekly departures at each port in the cycle, the number of ships needed to provide the
service is equal to the number of weeks that it takes a ship to complete the cycle. Under a resource
exchange alliance, each carrier in the alliance provides one or more ships to be used for the service,
and the capacity on each ship is partitioned among the alliance members. An example of such an
alliance is the China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) / United Arab Shipping Company (UASC)
Agreement4. The new joint service consists of the cycle of port visits of Xiamen, Hong Kong,
Yantian, Shanghai, New York, Norfolk, Savannah, Xiamen. The cycle takes 9 weeks to complete,
with weekly departures at each port, and thus deploys 9 vessels, 6 contributed by CSCL and 3
contributed by UASC. The alliance contract enables each carrier in the alliance to offer weekly
departures at each port in the service without having to commit 9 ships to the service.
Several advantages of alliances can be easily identified. By entering carrier alliances, the seller
can offer a larger number of itinerary products to a much wider choice of destinations, leading
2 Details of the contract can be seen at http://www2.fmc.gov/agreement_lib/011968-000.pdf
3 Please see similar contracts on http://www2.fmc.gov/agreements/type_npage.aspx
4 The contract detail can be found on http://www2.fmc.gov/agreement_lib/012168-000.pdf
4to enhanced marketing opportunities. It is especially apparent when carriers introduce new joint
services – without an alliance, each carrier may not have sufficient resources to offer such a global
service. Alliances also offer a consumer “seamless” worldwide travel/shippment experiences. Again,
suppose the carrier one operates a service with the cycle of port visits A,B,C,A, and carrier two
operates a service with the cycle of port visits A,D,E,A. Under no alliance, customers who want to
send a container from port C to port D via port A should make separate bookings with multiple
carriers. Even worse, if something goes wrong with the acquisition of one of the components in the
itinerary, it is difficult for the customer to get the other seller to make appropriate adjustments.
For example, if carrier one delays the arrival of the container at port A, then the customer has to
convince carrier two to change the booking from port A without a penalty, whereas such adjustment
should be easier if the customer made the booking with a single carrier. There also exists an
economic motivation. As will be shown in the paper, if separate sellers sell a partial product in the
itinerary, then each seller will have an incentive to charge a higher price for its component in order
to (at least implicitly) extract as much of the total revenue as it can. This leads to system-wide
inefficiencies and thus loss in total profit; in the example above, under no alliance, carrier one
would charge more for its own itinerary product, shipment of a container from port C to port A
and carrier two would do the same. Therefore, total prices for the complete shipment (port C to
port D via port A) would be higher, resulting in lower demand and profit. In fact, when the sellers
form a “well-designed contract” where they can sell a complete product to customers, profits may
increase.
However, along with its obvious benefits, an alliance could pose a new problem. After formation
of an alliance, alliance members can sell substitute products (in the previous example, both carriers
now offer a service of shipment from port C to port D) and thus compete with each other for
the same demand. That is, alliances increase not only the sellers’ product portfolios but also
competition. It is easy to see that a poorly designed alliance may be detrimental to both sellers
and therefore, the questions remains – are sellers better off with an alliance or not?
In this paper, our study focuses on resource exchange alliances. Since alliance members compete
by selling substitute products after an alliance, we propose an alliance design model which explic-
itly takes into account how the exchange of resources affects the competition among the alliance
members, unlike several other papers on resource exchange alliances. Our model is presented as
a stochastic optimization model with equilibrium constraints (SMPECs), and we determine the
optimal resource exchange amount which maximizes the sum of the alliance members’ total profits
after the exchange, considering the resulting competition. For each resource exchange, the competi-
tion among alliance members is modeled as a noncooperative game in which each alliance member
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chooses the prices for its own products, subject to its own capacity constraints (which depend on
the resource exchange), to maximize its own profit.
The paper is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature in the next section and then
provide an important economic motivation for interest in resource exchange alliances in Section 3.
As mentioned above, if customers want to buy a product that consists of components provided by
different sellers, then in an attempt to maximize their own profits, the sellers tend to choose prices
for their components that are too high, which leads to loss in total profit. Intuitively this happens
because each seller is implicitly attempting to gather a larger share of the total revenue without an
alliance. The idea is illustrated with a specific model in Section 3. It is shown that the equilibrium
prices without an alliance are higher than the prices under perfect coordination and the equilibrium
quantities without an alliance are lower than the quantities under perfect coordination. We also
show that the total profit of a resource exchange alliance with well-chosen exchange quantities
is greater than the total profit without an alliance. In addition, we show that the equilibrium
prices, quantities, and profits are equal for a resource exchange alliance with exchange quantities
chosen to maximize the total profit and for perfect coordination. The major purpose of the model
is to demonstrate that if customers want to buy a product that consists of components provided
by different sellers, then sellers who attempt to maximize their own profits will tend to choose
prices that are too high. A secondary purpose of the model is to demonstrate how a well designed
resource exchange alliance may increase the total profit and the amount of increase depends upon
the intensity of competition and the resource capacity.
In Section 4, we consider more general models of no alliance, perfect coordination, and a resource
exchange alliance. For resource exchange alliances, we formulate an optimization model to deter-
mine the amount of each resource to be exchanged, taking into account the consequences of the
exchange on subsequent competition among alliance members. If one assumes that after a resource
exchange, each alliance member chooses the prices of its products to maximize its own profit, and
that this behavior of the alliance members leads to an equilibrium, then the problem can be formu-
lated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. An important question is whether,
for each resource exchange, there exists an equilibrium and, if so, whether it is unique.
In Section 5 we show how to determine whether a unique equilibrium exists, and how to compute
it. We solve examples of the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (which in general
is a hard, poorly behaved problem), and in Section 6 we compare the results for the cases with no
alliance, perfect coordination, and a resource exchange alliance.
62. Related Literature
This paper is motivated by the design of resource exchange alliances in the liner shipping industry
and we formulate the alliance design problem as a Stochastic Mathematical Program with Equi-
librium Constraints (SMPEC). Therefore, our paper is related to two streams of research: studies
of liner shipping alliances and Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs).
When studying liner shipping and airline alliances, it is useful to note that in both industries
the term “alliance” is used for two different scales of agreement. The larger scale agreements
usually involve more than two carriers and can be described as agreements of large scope but
limited specificity with the idea that alliance members will enter into more specific collaborative
agreements with each other. Current examples are the Grand Alliance, the New World Alliance,
and the CKYH Alliance in the liner shipping industry and the Star Alliance, the Sky Team Alliance,
and the OneWorld Alliance in the airline industry. Most smaller scale agreements are between two
carriers, although sometimes more than two carriers are involved. These agreements address specific
operational collaboration rules, such as resource exchange, or free sale of each other’s capacity, or
sharing of facilities, such as port terminals or airport gates. These smaller scale agreements are
also called alliances. The agreements described in the introduction are examples of such alliances.
There is a substantial amount of literature on alliances which is mainly focused on strategic level
problems such as tactical motivations, the main driving factors for alliances, and the potential
outcomes of alliances. Slack et al. (2002) empirically examine the changes in services made by
container shipping lines in response to the formation of alliances and Yang et al. (2011) consider
the increase of ship size and new strategy of alliance and study the economic performance and
stability of liner shipping alliances. Panayides and Wiedmer (2011) also describe the structure and
dynamics of strategic alliances in container liner shipping and analyze the operational and strategic
changes within the last ten years.
Of particular interest to us is the part of this literature that highlights the competition among
alliance members as an important factor affecting the stability of alliances. For example, Midoro
and Pitto (2000) identify the existence of intra-alliance competition as a key force driving alliance
instability in the liner shipping industry. Lu et al. (2006) conducted a survey among members of
the CKYH Alliance to determine key strategic reasons for liner shipping alliances, disadvantages
of alliances, and reasons for success of alliances. They also recognize the competition between
alliance members as a primary disadvantage of strategic alliances in liner shipping. In addition, they
demonstrate that the two most important key strategic reasons for liner shipping alliances were
to expand service coverage and to increase service frequency, which are the two motivations that
we illustrated in the introduction. In this paper, we realize the importance of intra-competitions
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among alliance members and take those competitions into consideration in designing the optimal
alliance contract.
On the other hand, literature on alliance design is very sparse. Song and Panayides (2002) analyze
operations of liner shipping alliances involving two small examples in liner shipping. They propose
to use cooperative game theory to analyze strategic alliance but they do not address alliance design
decisions (such as resource exchange quantities or free sale prices). Agarwal and Ergun (2010)
address a large scale service network design in which ocean carriers integrate the networks and
share capacity on their ships in a liner shipping alliance. They propose a heuristic for choosing the
services to operate under the alliance and a heuristic for assigning the vessels of each alliance carrier
to the chosen services. They also propose the use of side payments made by each carrier who sends
a shipment along an edge in the network to all the alliance carriers in proportion to the capacity
contributed to the edge by the carriers, and then they model each carrier’s decision problem as
a linear program. Side payments that lead to the central optimal flows can then be obtained by
solving the resulting inverse problem. They mention the importance of competitive prices, but
their model assumes that the prices charged by the carriers for origin-destination shipments are
fixed exogenously and are not affected by the side payments that the carriers have to make. Their
model also assumes that the demands for each carrier are fixed exogenously and thus there is
no competition among carriers in their model, despite every alliance carrier’s ability to serve the
same origin-destination shipments using the same services. In contrast, in our model prices are
determined endogenously taking competition into account and these prices depend on the alliance
design. Our paper is most closely related to the one written by Lu et al. (2010). They consider a slot
exchange contract between two ocean carriers and propose two optimization models to determine
slot exchange amounts and the number of containers flowing between different origin-destination
port pairs. The optimization model in their paper is formulated from the point of view of one of
the two carriers whereas our model is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints with the upper level determining the slot exchange amounts maximizing the total profit
of the alliance and the lower level representing the competition between the alliance members after
slot exchange. Also, the model in Lu et al. (2010) takes prices as input whereas prices are decision
variables in the lower level of our model.
In the context of airline alliance collaborations and operations, there exist several interesting
studies which address questions such as the choice of flights to include in code-share agreements,
the choice of transfer price or proration rates in free-sale alliances, and the effect of airline alliances
on booking limits. For example, Sivakumar (2003) presents Code Share Optimizer, a tool built by
United Airlines that considers the interaction between proration agreements, demand, fares, and
market shares and O’Neal et al. (2007) built a code-share flight profitability tool to automate the
8code-share flight selection process at Delta airlines. Abdelghany et al. (2009) also present a model
for airlines to determine a set of flights for a code-share agreement. On the other hand, Netessine
and Shumsky (2005) examine how horizontal and vertical competition affect airline seat inventory
decisions and how airlines in an alliance may coordinate these decisions by agreements similar to
revenue-sharing contracts. Hu et al. (2013) extend the analysis in Netessine and Shumsky (2005)
and study a model of a free-sale airline alliance. Similar to our model, their model is a two-stage
model with the alliance design decision in the first stage and operational selling decisions of indi-
vidual airlines in the second stage, formulated as a Nash equilibrium problem. In addition to static
proration scheme, Wright et al. (2010) formulate a Markov-game dynamic model of two airlines
and Wright (2011) extends the dynamic bid-price sharing scheme under incomplete information.
In the present paper, we are concerned with a particular formulation of stochastic mathematical
programs that involve equilibrium constraints. MPEC plays a very important role in many fields
such as operations research, economics, and engineering design and it has been receiving more and
more attention in the optimization field. However, at the same time, it is well known that MPECs
are still one of the most challenging problems in optimization, and there is a strong need to improve
and develop the advance theoretical and numerical tools to be applied in practical problems.
MPECs are constrained optimization problems with constraints resulting from an equilibrium
problem. They are a generalization of a bilevel problem, where instead of a lower-level optimization
problem, there is a lower-level equilibrium problem, possibly defined by a parametric variational
inequality. MPECs are difficult, non-convex and non-smooth optimization problem and thus the
well developed nonlinear programming theory cannot be applied to MPECs directly. We may
refer to, e.g., Giallombardo and Ralph (2008), DeMiguel et al. (2005), Facchinei and Pang (2003),
Luo et al. (1996), and references therein for a further discussion. Since MPECs are already very
difficult to handle, obviously, stochastic MPECs are extremely difficult to deal with due to the
additional efforts required to account for the uncertainty involved in the problem (e.g., Birbil et al.
2006, Shapiro and Xu 2008, Xu and Ye 2010, and Shanbhag et al. 2011). Although MPECs and
stochastic MPECs are important modeling tools for numerous applications, there is only little
literature that demonstrates successful formulation and provides an efficient solution approach for
nontrivial examples. Kachani et al. (2008) address the dynamic pricing problem with learning of the
parameters in the price-demand relationship. They show that the problem can be formulated as a
MPEC problem, propose a solution method, and discuss various insights through a computational
study. Also, Coˆte´ et al. (2003) propose a new modeling approach for pricing and fare optimization
in the airline industry based on a bilevel mathematical programming and demonstrate that the
use of this modeling paradaim allows a company to maximize revenue while taking into account
the behavior of the passengers as well as the complex topology of airline networks in a detailed
fashion.
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3. An Economic Rationale for Alliances
In this section we present an economic rationale for alliances in a setting where customers want a
product that is composed of products (here called resources) sold by two sellers. For example, a
customer wants to send a container from A to C and to accomplish that in the absence of an alliance
the customer buys transportation service from A to B provided by one seller and transportation
service from B to C provided by another seller. The intuitive idea behind the economic rationale
is that each seller chooses its price to extract the maximum profit for the seller and in the absence
of an alliance, the resulting equilibrium prices are too high in the sense that lower prices maximize
the total profit of the two sellers. We use a simple model to illustrate the idea. We also use the
model to introduce resource exchange alliances in a simple setting before proceeding to the more
general setting. For the model, it also turns out that a well designed alliance attains the maximum
total profit which could be attained under the perfect coordination. We will discuss the general
setting in detail later but the core insight will remain same.
We consider 2 sellers, indexed by i = ±1. Each seller produces one resource. Seller i produces
resource i and a maximum quantity bi of resource i can be consumed. Seller i has a constant
marginal cost of ci per unit of resource i consumed and seller i chooses the price y˜i + ci per unit
of resource i, that is, y˜i denotes the price in excess of the marginal cost ci per unit of resource i.
Customers want to consume a product that requires one unit of each resource. (In this section, there
is no demand for a product that consists of only one resource. General settings will be discussed
in later sections.) Thus, customers buy products consisting of one unit of each resource and pay
c−1+ y˜−1+c1+ y˜1 per unit of product. The demand d for products depends on the prices as follows:
d = max{0, α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)} (1)
where α˜ and β˜ are positive constants known to each seller. Assume that α˜ > 0, that is, demand is
positive if each seller charges only its marginal cost. The detailed calculations for this section are
given in Appendix A.
3.1. No Alliance
First consider the case with no alliance which is modeled as a non-cooperative game. Let bmin :=
min{b−1, b1}. Thus, the number of products sold is given by min{bmin, max{0, α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)}}
and the profit of seller i is given by
g˜i(y˜i, y˜−i) := y˜imin{bmin, max{0, α˜− β˜(y˜−i + y˜i)}}
If bmin ≥ α˜/3, then the equilibrium prices are given by
y˜∗i =
α˜
3β˜
(2)
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the equilibrium demand is equal to
α˜− β˜(y˜∗−1 + y˜∗1) =
α˜
3
> 0 (3)
the resulting profit of seller i is equal to
y˜∗i min{bmin, max{0, α˜− β˜(y˜∗−i + y˜∗i )}} =
α˜2
9β˜
(4)
and thus the total profit of both sellers together is equal to
y˜∗−1
[
α˜− β˜(y˜∗−1 + y˜∗1)
]
+ y˜∗1
[
α˜− β˜(y˜∗−1 + y˜∗1)
]
=
2α˜2
9β˜
(5)
If bmin ≤ α˜/3, then all pairs of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) on the line segment between (bmin/β˜, [α˜−2bmin]/β˜)
and ([α˜−2bmin]/β˜, bmin/β˜) are equilibria. For all of these equilibrium prices the total price is equal
to (α˜− bmin)/β˜, the demand is equal to bmin, the resulting profit of seller i is equal to y˜ibmin, and
thus the total profit of both sellers together is equal to
y˜−1bmin + y˜1bmin =
α˜− bmin
β˜
bmin (6)
3.2. Perfect Coordination
Next we determine the maximum achievable total profit of the two sellers together, that is, the
total profit if the sellers would perfectly coordinate pricing.
The total profit of the two sellers is given by
g˜(y˜−1, y˜1) := [y˜−1 + y˜1]min{bmin, max{0, α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)}}
If bmin ≥ α˜/2, then the optimal total price is equal to
y¯−1 + y¯1 =
α˜
2β˜
(7)
Note that (2) and (7) show that y˜∗−1 + y˜
∗
1 > y¯−1 + y¯1, that is, the total of the equilibrium prices
under no alliance is greater than the optimal total price. (These results are reminiscent of the
comparison of the cases with and without vertical integration by Spengler (1950); however, the
setting here is different because one seller does not buy a product from another seller and add a
mark-up before reselling it.) The corresponding demand is equal to
α˜− β˜(y¯−1 + y¯1) = α˜
2
>
α˜
3
= α˜− β˜(y˜∗−1 + y˜∗1) (8)
and the total profit of both sellers together is equal to
[y¯−1 + y¯1]
[
α˜− β˜(y¯−1 + y¯1)
]
=
α˜2
4β˜
(9)
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If bmin ≤ α˜/2, then the optimal total price is given by y¯−1 + y¯1 = (α˜− bmin)/β˜, with correspond-
ing demand equal to bmin. The total profit of both sellers together is equal to (y¯−1 + y¯1) bmin =
(α˜− bmin) bmin/β˜,
Note that when capacity is small, bmin ≤ α˜/3, the total profit of the setting with no alliance
cannot be increased by coordination. When capacity is large, bmin ≥ α˜/2, the relative amount by
which the total profit can be increased is given by
α˜2
4β˜
− 2α˜2
9β˜
2α˜2
9β˜
=
1
8
When capacity is intermediate, α˜/3≤ bmin ≤ α˜/2, then the relative amount by which the total
profit can be increased is bounded by
0 ≤
α˜−bmin
β˜
bmin− 2α˜29β˜
2α˜2
9β˜
≤ 1
8
This potential increase in profit is the major economic motivation for alliances. The extent to
which this increase can be attained by an alliance depends on the capacity and the customer choice
behavior, including the extent to which the sellers can differentiate their products. In the next
section we consider a resource exchange alliance and investigate the effect of both capacity and
product differentiation on the total profit with and without an alliance.
3.3. Resource Exchange Alliance
In this paper, we focus on a form of alliances, so called “resource exchange alliance”. Under this
type of alliance, alliance members exchange resources (e.g., container slots) in advance of sales.
After exchange, each seller controls resources allocated to them as though they were the owners
of the resources. The key questions is how much of each resource (including money) should be
exchanged to maximize the total profit of alliance members. One important thing to note here is
that after exchange, alliance members compete for the same demand since each seller chooses their
own prices to sell products. Therefore, it is critical to take the resulting competition into account
when determining the optimal resource exchange amounts. As we will show later, the competition
is affected by capacity and product differentiation levels.
Consider a resource exchange alliance involving the two sellers. Let xi ∈ [0, bi] denote the amount
of resource i that seller i makes available to seller −i, and let x := (x−1, x1). Then the number of
units of the two-resource product that seller i can sell is qi(x) := min{bi−xi, x−i}. Typically, cost
items that make up the largest part of the marginal cost ci of seller i are passed on to the customer
via the marketing seller even if the customer buys the product from seller −i. For example, in
the case of ocean carriers, these marginal costs consist mostly of amounts paid to other parties
12
such as the port operator for stevedoring services and storage. Hence, assume that seller −i pays
seller i an amount ci for each unit of resource i that seller −i uses, so that each seller has marginal
cost equal to c−1 + c1 for the two-resource product. Specifically, a resource exchange alliance with
zero exchange of resources (x= 0) may be chosen, in which case the sellers sell only the separate
resources as in the case without an alliance. Thus, in general, the total profit of an optimally
designed resource exchange alliance is no less than the total profit without an alliance. Let yi
denote the markup of seller i, that is, the difference between the price of seller i and the marginal
cost c−1 + c1 for the two-resource product.
The demand di(yi, y−i) for the product sold by seller i depends on the prices as follows:
di(yi, y−i) = max{0, α−βyi + γy−i)} (10)
where α and β are positive constants and γ ∈ (0, β). That is, after the alliance, sellers sell substitute
product and therefore compete with each other. Here, provision is made for brand distinction
between the products sold by the sellers. The constants are known to each seller. To keep the
number of parameters in this example small, the constants α, β, and γ are the same for both
sellers.
Under this setting, the number of units of product sold by seller i is given by
min{qi(x), max{0, α−βyi + γy−i)}}, and the profit of seller i is given by
gi(x, yi, y−i) := yimin{qi(x), max{0, α−βyi + γy−i}}
Next we establish a relation between α˜ and β˜, and α, β and γ, to facilitate a fair comparison
among the settings with no alliance, with perfect coordination, and with an alliance. Consider
prices (y˜−1, y˜1) in the no-alliance setting, such that y˜−1 + y˜1 < α˜/β˜. Suppose that the two alliance
members charge the same price y−1 = y1 = y˜−1 + y˜1 for the two-resource products. Then the total
demand in the no-alliance setting given by (1) is equal to α˜− β˜(y˜−1+ y˜1)> 0, and the total demand
in the alliance setting given by (10) is equal to 2(α− βy1 + γy1) = 2α− 2(β − γ)(y˜−1 + y˜1). Thus
the total demand in the two settings is the same if α˜= 2α and β˜ = 2(β − γ). It is also shown in
Appendix A.4 that a model of perfect coordination with demand given by (10) leads to the same
optimal prices, demands, and profits as the model in Section 3.2 with demand given by (1) if α˜= 2α
and β˜ = 2(β − γ). Hence the results for the settings with no alliance, with perfect coordination,
and with an alliance will be compared using α˜= 2α and β˜ = 2(β− γ).
For the setting with an alliance, for any given resource exchange x, let (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x)) denote
the equilibrium prices of the two sellers for the two-resource product. The alliance design problem
is to choose x∈ [0, b−1]× [0, b1] to maximize
f(x) := g−1(x, y
∗
−1(x), y
∗
1(x)) + g1(x, y
∗
1(x), y
∗
−1(x))
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and x∗ denote an optimal resource exchange. (existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are
addressed in the detailed calculations in Appendix A.3. The resulting profit of seller i is given by
gi(x, y
∗
i (x), y
∗
−i(x)).
A natural question here might be on how the total profit f(x∗) should be partitioned among the
alliance members. First, note that if money can be exchanged together with the other resources,
then any partition of the total profit can be achieved. In that case, the Nash bargaining solution for
a two-player cooperative game provides a compelling partition of the total profit that is also easy
to characterize: each alliance member receives its profit in the setting without an alliance plus half
the difference between the maximum total profit f(x∗) of the alliance and the total profit without
an alliance. Detailed discussion and derivation is given in Section 4.6.
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the results for the settings with no alliance, with perfect coor-
dination, and with an alliance. The detailed calculations are given in Appendix A. Here we just
mention that there are three cases regarding capacity: (1) Capacity bmin is large enough so that both
sellers can be provided with sufficient product capacity qi(x) to make capacity not constraining in
equilibrium (bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β− γ)), (2) Capacity bmin is so small that the product capacity qi(x) of
both sellers must be constraining in equilibrium (bmin ≤ αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)), and (3) Capacity bmin
is small enough that the product capacity qi(x) of at least one seller must be constraining in equi-
librium but large enough so that one seller can be provided with sufficient product capacity qi(x)
to make capacity not constraining in equilibrium (αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)≤ bmin ≤ 2αβ/(2β− γ)).
Figure 2 shows a plot of the relative increase in total profit with an alliance over no alliance,
that is, (f(x∗)− [g˜−1(y˜∗−1, y˜∗1) + g˜1(y˜∗1 , y˜∗−1)])/[g˜−1(y˜∗−1, y˜∗1) + g˜1(y˜∗1 , y˜∗−1)], as a function of bmin/α and
γ/β. The figure shows that the relative increase is largest when the capacity is large (bmin ≥ α).
In addition, the total profit under an alliance equals the total profit under perfect coordination as
shown in Table 1. One additional observation which is interesting to note here is that in addition
to profit increase, the prices without an alliance are higher than the prices under an alliance except
when the capacity is small (where the prices and profits are same). In summary, we could show that
a well designed resource exchange alliance indeed captures the foregone profit without an alliance.
For general models presented later in Section 4 and Section 6, the main insights remain same.
4. Model
In this section, we present a general model for a resource exchange alliance which could involve
multiple resources. In addition to the alliance model, we also present models for the settings with
no alliance and with perfect coordination to facilitate comparisons.
As we describe in Section 3.3, a resource exchange alliance can be designed in two stages. At
the first stage, alliance members together determine the optimal resource exchange amount which
14
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Figure 1 The regions distinguished in Table 1
Table 1 Comparison of no alliance, perfect coordination, and a resource exchange alliance, in terms of price,
demand, total profit, and consumer surplus, for a single product with two resources.
Region Capacity Quantity No-Alliance Perfect Coordination Alliance
1 0≤ bmin ≤ 2α3 Total Price 2α−bmin2(β−γ) 2α−bmin2(β−γ) 2α−bmin2(β−γ)
Total Demand bmin bmin bmin
Total Profit (2α−bmin)bmin
2(β−γ)
(2α−bmin)bmin
2(β−γ)
(2α−bmin)bmin
2(β−γ)
2 2α
3
≤ bmin ≤ α Total Price 2α3(β−γ) 2α−bmin2(β−γ) 2α−bmin2(β−γ)
Total Demand 2α
3
bmin bmin
Total Profit 4α
2
9(β−γ)
(2α−bmin)bmin
2(β−γ)
(2α−bmin)bmin
2(β−γ)
3 α≤ bmin Total Price 2α3(β−γ) α2(β−γ) α2(β−γ)
Total Demand 2α
3
α α
Total Profit 4α
2
9(β−γ)
α2
2(β−γ)
α2
2(β−γ)
maximizes the total profit of both sellers before the demand becomes known. At the second stage,
each seller separately sets the optimal price to maximize their own profit under some constraints.
As we have discussed earlier, the alliance members are now competing with each other by selling
substitute products. Thus, an important aspect of this modeling is that when we make a decision
at the first stage, we need to incorporate the resulting competition from the second stage. The
modeling can be done with stochastic mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints.
We will discuss more details in this section.
4.1. Multiple-Resource Network Example
We first provide an example with multiple resources to illustrate the models that will be formulated
in later sections.
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Figure 2 Plot of the relative increase in total profit with an alliance over no alliance, that is,
(f(x∗)− [g˜−1(y˜∗−1, y˜∗1) + g˜1(y˜∗1 , y˜∗−1)])/[g˜−1(y˜∗−1, y˜∗1) + g˜1(y˜∗1 , y˜∗−1)], as a function of bmin/α and γ/β.
Consider 2 sellers, indexed by i=±1. (It can be easily seen from the results in Section 4.3 how
to extend the model and the solution method to a setting with more than 2 sellers at the cost
of more complicated notation.) Seller i produces ki resource types indexed by j = 1, . . . , ki. For
example, resource j may denote the voyage of ocean carrier i scheduled to depart from Cape Town
to Santos every Monday at 8am. Initially, before any resource exchange, seller i has quantity bi,j
of resource j and a constant marginal cost of ci,j per unit of resource j consumed.
A liner shipping network is shown in Figure 3 and some voyage and port data are given in
Table 2. In this network, port 1 is a connection hub for both ocean carriers. In fact, this network is
similar to the one in the Hanjin-Evergreen Agreement described in the Introduction. Each carrier
operates 4 voyages. For example, voyage 5, taking place from port 1 to port 4, is operated by
carrier 1, and has a capacity of 3000 TEU. The set of products that can be sold by each carrier
is different in the case with no alliance and the case with an alliance. Table 3 shows the products
and the corresponding itineraries (here simply specified by the origin-destination pair) which could
be offered by the two carriers. The column labeled “Carrier” specifies which carriers can sell each
product in the case with no alliance and with an alliance. For example, in the case with no alliance,
product 7 can be sold by carrier 1 only, and in the case with an alliance, product 7 can be sold by
both carriers (“A” denotes both carriers under alliance). On the other hand, product 17, involving
travel from port 3 to port 4 via port 1, can only be sold in the case with an alliance and in that
case it can be sold by both carriers. However, note that there is demand for travel from port 3
to port 4 both in the case with no alliance and in the case with an alliance. In the case with no
alliance, all demand for travel from port 3 to port 4 is satisfied by making two separate bookings;
a booking with carrier -1 for travel from port 3 to port 1 and a booking with carrier 1 for travel
16
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Figure 3 Multiple-resource network example
Voyage number Carrier Departure Arrival Capacity (TEU)
1 -1 1 2 3000
2 -1 2 1 3000
3 -1 1 3 3000
4 -1 3 1 3000
5 1 1 4 3000
6 1 4 1 3000
7 1 1 5 3000
8 1 5 1 3000
Table 2 Voyage information
Table 3 Product information for network example.
Product Carrier Origin Destination Product Carrier Origin Destination
1 -1 or A 1 2 11 1 or A 4 5
2 -1 or A 2 1 12 1 or A 5 4
3 -1 or A 1 3 13 A only 2 4
4 -1 or A 3 1 14 A only 4 2
5 -1 or A 2 3 15 A only 2 5
6 -1 or A 3 2 16 A only 5 2
7 1 or A 1 4 17 A only 3 4
8 1 or A 4 1 18 A only 4 3
9 1 or A 1 5 19 A only 3 5
10 1 or A 5 1 20 A only 5 3
from port 1 to port 4. In the case with an alliance, demand for travel from port 3 to port 4 can be
satisfied in four different ways: (1) by making a booking with carrier -1 for travel from port 3 to
port 1 and a booking with carrier 1 for travel from port 1 to port 4, or (2) by making a booking
with carrier 1 for travel from port 3 to port 1 and a booking with carrier -1 for travel from port 1
to port 4, or (3) by making a booking for travel from port 3 to port 4 via port 1 with carrier -1, or
(4) by making a booking for travel from port 3 to port 4 via port 1 with carrier 1. In the case with
an alliance, the choices exercised by the buyers and thus the resulting aggregate demand depends
on the prices of the carriers for the different products. In this paper we consider linear models of
aggregate demand as specified in more detail later.
4.2. Resource Exchange Alliance Model
In this section we introduce a general model of a resource exchange alliance involving multiple
resources. After resource exchange, seller i may have some of each resource supplied by seller −i
as well as some of each resource supplied by itself. Index the union of the resources by j = 1, . . . , k,
where k= k−1 + k1. Let bi = (bi,1, . . . , bi,k) denote the initial endowment of seller i of each resource
(bi,j = 0 if resource j is supplied by seller −i). Let xj denote the amount of resource j that seller 1
makes available to seller −1. For example, x= (−1100,−1200,−1000,−1500,1400,1700,1300,1600)
for the network in Section 4.1 means that carrier −1 gives 1100 TEU on voyage 1 to carrier 1,
carrier 1 gives 1400 TEU on voyage 5 to carrier −1, etc.
After the resource exchange, seller i can sell mi products, indexed by `= 1, . . . ,mi. In the example
in Table 3, mi = 20 for i=±1. Let yi,` denote the price of seller i for product ` in excess of the
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marginal cost of the product, and di,` denote the demand for product ` of seller i. Consider the
following linear demand model:
di,` = −
mi∑
`′=1
Ei,`,`′yi,`′ +
m−i∑
`′=1
B−i,`,`′y−i,`′ +Ci,` (11)
where Ei,`,`′ denotes the rate of change of the demand for product ` of seller i with respect to the
price of product `′ of the same seller i, and B−i,`,`′ denotes the rate of change of the demand for
product ` of seller i with respect to the price of product `′ of the other seller −i. Using matrix
notation, di =−Eiyi+B−iy−i+Ci, where di, yi,Ci ∈Rmi , Ei ∈Rmi×mi , Bi ∈Rm−i×mi , and attention
is restricted to values of (y−1, y1) such that di ≥ 0 for i = ±1. Let Ai ∈ Rk×mi be the “network
matrix”, i.e., Ai,j,` denotes the amount of resource j consumed by each unit of product ` sold by
seller i.
Next we introduce the two-stage alliance design problem. Given a first stage resource exchange
decision x∈Rk, at the second stage each seller i wants to solve the following optimization problem:
max
yi,di∈Rmi+
yTi di
s.t. Aidi ≤ bi− ix
di = −Eiyi +B−iy−i +Ci ≥ 0
(12)
We are interested in the Nash equilibrium defined by the two optimization problems (12) for i=±1.
Since the demand in unknown at the first stage, we are taking the demand uncertainty into account
with a stochastic version of the alliance design problem as follows. At the first stage, when x is
chosen, elements of matrices Ei and Bi, and vectors Ci, are random. However, the network matrices
Ai are deterministic. Let ξ := (E−1,E1,B−1,B1,C−1,C1) denote the random data vector. At the
first stage, the expected value with respect to the distribution of ξ of an objective (specified below)
is optimized. Also, note that the Nash equilibrium associated with the second stage depends on
the realization of ξ.
Let Qi := Ei +E
T
i ∈ Rmi×mi denote the symmetric version of Ei. We assume that matrices Ei
and hence Qi, are positive definite. Let Im denote the m×m identity matrix, 0m denotes the zero
vector in Rm, and 0m,n denotes the zero matrix in Rm×n. Then the optimization problem (12) can
be written as follows:
min
yi∈Rmi+
1
2
yTi Qiyi− yTi B−iy−i−CTi yi
s.t. Wi (Eiyi−B−iy−i) ≥ ηi + iMix.
(13)
where
Wi :=
[
Ai
−Imi
]
, ηi := WiC˜i +
[−bi
0mi
]
, Mi :=
[
Ik
0mi,k
]
.
A point (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x)) is a solution of the equilibrium problem if y
∗
1(x) is an optimal solution of
problem (13) for i= 1 when y−1 = y∗−1(x), and also y
∗
−1(x) is an optimal solution of problem (13)
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for i=−1 when y1 = y∗1(x). Note that (y∗−1(x), y∗1(x)) also depends on ξ but the dependence is not
shown in the notation. (The above problem is called a generalized Nash equilibrium problem since
the feasible set of problem (13) depends on y−i.) Let Vi(x, ξ), i=±1, denote the optimal objective
values of problem (13) at the equilibrium point given data ξ, i.e.,
Vi(x, ξ) :=
1
2
y∗i (x)
TQiy
∗
i (x)− y∗i (x)TB−iy∗−i(x)−CTi y∗i (x) (14)
Note that these functions are well defined only if the equilibrium point (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x)) exists and
is unique. We will discuss existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point in Section 4.3.
Now, at the first stage, we consider designs of the resource exchange alliance that aim to maximize
the total profit of the sellers. Let b = b1 − b−1 ∈ Rk. Note that bj > 0 if resource j is supplied
by seller 1 and bj < 0 if resource j is supplied by seller −1. Let lj and uj be lower and upper
bounds, respectively, such that bjlj ≥ 0 and bjuj ≥ 0, that is, lj, uj, and bj have the same sign, and
|lj| ≤ |uj| ≤ |bj|. Then the first stage problem is as follows:
max
x∈Rk
{
f(x) := E
[
V−1(x, ξ) +V1(x, ξ)
]}
s.t. bjxj ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , k
|lj| ≤ |xj| ≤ |uj| ∀ j = 1, . . . , k
(15)
As mentioned, the expectation in (15) is with respect to a specified probability distribution of
the data vector ξ. In particular, if a single value for ξ is considered in the first stage, then the
problem (15) is deterministic and the expectation operator can be removed.
4.3. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Recall that the matrices Qi are positive definite and hence problem (13) is a convex quadratic
programming problem. The first order (KKT) necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for
problem (13) are
Qiyi−B−iy−i−Ci−ETiW Ti λi = 0
Wi (Eiyi−B−iy−i)− ηi− iMix ≥ 0
λi ≥ 0
λTi [Wi (Eiyi−B−iy−i)− ηi− iMix] = 0
(16)
where λi denotes the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the inequality constraints
in (13).
The optimality conditions (16) can be written as a variational inequality. A widely used “stan-
dard” approach to establish existence and uniqueness of a solution to the optimality conditions and
thus existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium is to exploit monotonicity of the variational
inequality. However, in our case the variational inequality is not monotone and therefore a different
approach is required. We explain how we could solve the MPEC problem next.
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Consider the optimization problem
min
y−1,y1,λ−1,λ1
∑
i=±1
λTi [Wi (Eiyi−B−iy−i)− ηi− iMix]
s.t. Qiyi−B−iy−i−Ci−ETiW Ti λi = 0, i=±1
Wi (Eiyi−B−iy−i)− ηi− iMix ≥ 0, i=±1
λi ≥ 0, i=±1
(17)
Note that the objective value of problem (17) is nonnegative at all feasible points, and
(y∗−1, y
∗
1 , λ
∗
−1, λ
∗
1) is a solution of the optimality conditions (16) if and only if its objective value in
problem (17) is zero, in which case it is an optimal solution of problem (17). It follows from the
first equation of (16) that
λTiWi = y
T
i QiE
−1
i − yT−iBT−iE−1i −CTi E−1i
After substitution of this into the objective, problem (17) becomes
min
y−1,y1,λ−1,λ1
∑
i=±1
(
yTi QiE
−1
i − yT−iBT−iE−1i −CTi E−1i
)
(Eiyi−B−iy−i)−λTi (ηi + iMix)
s.t. Qiyi−B−iy−i−Ci−ETiW Ti λi = 0, i=±1
Wi (Eiyi−B−iy−i)− ηi− iMix ≥ 0, i=±1
λi ≥ 0, i=±1
(18)
We note that the objective function of problem (18) is quadratic with its quadratic term
(yT−1, y
T
1 )Ψ (y
T
−1, y
T
1 )
T, where
Ψ :=
[
Q−1 +BT−1E
−1
1 B−1 −B−1−Q−1E−1−1B1
−B1−Q1E−11 B−1 Q1 +BT1E−1−1B1
]
(19)
The problem (18) is a convex quadratic program if and only if the matrix Ψ, or equivalently the
symmetric matrix Ψ + ΨT, is positive semidefinite.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the problem (18) is feasible and that the matrix Ψ, defined in (19), is
positive definite. Then problem (18) has an optimal solution (y∗−1, y
∗
1 , λ
∗
−1, λ
∗
1) with (y
∗
−1, y
∗
1) being
unique. Moreover, if the optimal objective value of problem (18) is zero, then (y∗−1, y
∗
1) is the unique
Nash equilibrium.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
A similar approach can be used if there are more than two sellers. In such a case more than two
sets of optimality conditions of the form (16) will be involved and in the quadratic program (18)
the index i will take on more than two values.
Given the reformulation above, the question of existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
can be answered with the following steps: (1) verify that the matrix Ψ (or the symmetric matrix
Ψ + ΨT) is positive definite, (2) solve the convex quadratic program (18) if Ψ is positive definite,
and (3) verify that the optimal objective value is zero. Note that if Ψ is positive definite, then
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the quadratic program (18) can be solved efficiently and hence existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium point can easily be verified numerically. Some simple necessary conditions and sufficient
conditions for Ψ to be positive definite can be identified. A necessary condition for Ψ to be positive
definite is that its block diagonal matrices Q−1 + BT−1E
−1
1 B−1 and Q1 + B
T
1E
−1
−1B1 be positive
definite. Note that these matrices are indeed positive definite because E−1 and E1 are positive
definite. Also, note that if B−1 and B1 are null matrices, then matrix Ψ is the block diagonal
matrix diag(Q−1,Q1), and hence Ψ is positive definite because Q−1 and Q1 are positive definite.
More general, if matrices Ei are “significantly bigger” than Bi, then one may expect matrix Ψ to
be positive definite. The intuitive explanation of this sufficient condition is that if the demand for
each seller’s product depends on the price of the product more than it depends on the prices of
other products, then the matrix is positive definite. Another instructive example is the following.
Example 1. Suppose that the products of the two sellers are direct substitutes for each other,
that is, for each product of seller i there is a product of seller −i that is a close substitute. This
allows the possibility that seller −i may not be able to sell the substitute product because it does
not have the resources to do so. It seems that in the applications of interest, the set of products can
always be chosen so that this property holds. Hence, the matrices Bi are squared, i.e., m−1 =m1.
Suppose that the matrices Ei and Bi, i=±1, are diagonal. Then Qi =Ei and
Ψ =
[
E−1 +B2−1E
−1
1 −B−1−B1
−B−1−B1 E1 +B21E−1−1
]
.
Since matrices Ei are positive definite it follows that E1 +B
2
1E
−1
−1 is positive definite, and thus
it follows by the Schur complement condition for positive definiteness that Ψ is positive definite
if and only if the matrix E−1 +B2−1E
−1
1 − (B−1 +B1)2(E1 +B21E−1−1)−1 is positive definite. Since
matrices Ei and Bi are diagonal, this matrix is positive definite if and only if the matrix
(E−1 +B
2
−1E
−1
1 )(E1 +B
2
1E
−1
−1)− (B−1 +B1)2 = E−1E1 +B2−1B21E−1−1E−11 − 2B−1B1
is positive definite. In turn this matrix is positive definite if and only if the matrix
E2−1E
2
1 +B
2
−1B
2
1 − 2E−1E1B−1B1 = (E−1E1−B−1B1)2
is positive definite. Note that the last matrix is always positive semidefinite and is positive definite
if and only if matrix E−1E1−B−1B1 does not have any zero diagonal elements.
4.4. No Alliance Model
In this section, we present a model for the setting with no alliance. This model will be used to
compare the profits under no alliance, under an alliance, and under perfect coordination. First we
describe the demand model for the setting with no alliance.
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Under an alliance, there are a total of m distinct products. Some of the products may be offered
by only one seller and some of the products may be offered by both sellers. In the example in
Table 3, m = 20 and each of the 20 products is offered by both sellers in an alliance. These m
products can be partitioned into three subsets: sets Li, for i=±1, of products which can be offered
by seller i with and without an alliance and set L0 of products which could be offered only under
an alliance. For the example in Table 3, L−1 contains products 1 to 6, L1 contains products 7 to 12,
and L0 contains products 13 to 20.
As before, let y˜i,` denote the price of seller i for product ` ∈ Li. Suppose that the resulting
demand for product `∈Li is given by
d˜i,` = −
∑
`′∈Li
E˜i,`,`′ y˜i,`′ +
∑
`′∈L−i
B˜−i,`,`′ y˜−i,`′ + C˜i,` (20)
Using matrix notation, d˜i = −E˜iy˜i + B˜−iy˜−i + C˜i, where d˜i, y˜i, C˜i ∈ R|Li|, E˜i ∈ R|Li|×|Li|, B˜i ∈
R|L−i|×|Li|, and attention is restricted to values of (y˜−1, y˜1) such that d˜i ≥ 0 for i=±1. Let A˜i,j,`
denote the amount of resource j consumed by each unit of product ` ∈ Li, and let A˜i ∈ Rki×|Li|
denote the network matrix.
Similar to the example with two resources in Section 3, the parameters E,B,C in demand
model (11) and the parameters E˜, B˜, C˜ in demand model (20) should be related in a particular
way to facilitate a fair comparison of the prices, demands, and total profits between the settings
with and without an alliance. The derivation of the relation is given in Appendix C.
The setting with no alliance is formulated as a non-cooperative game in which each seller i wants
to solve the optimization problem
max
y˜i,d˜i∈R|Li|+
y˜Ti d˜i
s.t. A˜id˜i ≤ bi
d˜i = −E˜iy˜i + B˜−iy˜−i + C˜i ≥ 0
(21)
The no alliance outcome is the Nash equilibrium defined by the two optimization problems (21)
for i = ±1 as long as it exists and is unique. The Nash equilibrium is computed using the same
approach described in Section 4.3.
4.5. Perfect Coordination Model
The models with and without an alliance presented above are compared with a perfect coordination
model given in this section. The perfect coordination model considers a setting in which the sellers
coordinate pricing together to maximize the sum of the sellers’ profits as given by the following
optimization problem:
max
(y−1,y1)∈Rm−1×Rm1
∑
i=±1
yTi (−Eiyi +B−iy−i +Ci)
s.t.
∑
i=±1
Ai (−Eiyi +B−iy−i +Ci) ≤ b−1 + b1
−Eiyi +B−iy−i +Ci ≥ 0 , i=±1
(22)
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4.6. Alliance Profit Allocation
In a resource exchange alliance, resources including money are exchanged between the alliance
members. Thus the allocation of the alliance profit is one of the alliance design decisions. In this
section, we address the question of how the alliance profit should be allocated to each members.
We follow an axiomatic approach, similar to Nash (1950, 1953), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)
and Kalai (1977). To better explain the meaning of one of the axioms, here we allow the profits
of the sellers to be measured in different currency units with exchange rate coefficients e−1, e1 to
convert the profits to a common currency unit, but in the rest of the paper, it is assumed that the
costs and revenues have already been converted to the same currency unit. Let a= (a−1, a1) denote
the Nash equilibrium profits if the sellers do not form an alliance, that is, ai ∈R denotes the profit
of seller i if the sellers do not collaborate.
Let the maximum total profit g∗ := sup{e−1g−1(x, y−1, y1) + e1g1(x, y1, y−1) : 0≤ xi ≤ bi, i=±1,
(y−1, y1) is a Nash equilibrium after resource exchange x}. The set of achievable profit pairs under
a resource exchange alliances is denoted by A := {(b−1, b1) : ai ≤ bi, i=±1, e−1b−1 + e1b1 ≤ g∗}.
Also, let A denote the set of all such allocation problems characterized by (a,A). An allocation
solution is a function f :A 7→R2 such that f(a,A)∈A for all (a,A)∈A. Given these notations, we
impose the following axioms on an allocation solution:
Pareto optimality: For each (a,A)∈A, it holds that f(a,A) is strongly Pareto optimal on A, that
is, for each b∈A such that b 6= f(a,A) it holds that fi(a,A)> bi for at least one i.
Symmetry: For each symmetric (a,A)∈A, that is, a−1 = a1 and if (b−1, b1)∈A then (b1, b−1)∈A,
it holds that f−1(a,A) = f1(a,A).
Invariance under positively homogeneous affine transformations: For each (a,A) ∈ A and coeffi-
cients c−1, c1 > 0, d−1, d1 ∈R, consider the allocation problem (a′,A′)∈A given by a′i := ciai+di and
A′ := {(c−1b−1 + d−1, c1b1 + d1)∈R2 : (b−1, b1)∈A}. Then f(a′,A′) satisfies fi(a′,A′) = cifi(a,A) +
di for i=±1.
The last axiom means that the profit allocation to each seller is independent of the currency units
in which the seller’s profits are measured and independent of the inclusion of constant costs or
revenues in the profit function.
Proposition 1. The unique allocation solution that satisfies the axioms of Pareto optimality,
symmetry, and invariance under positively homogeneous affine transformations is given by
fi(a,A) =
g∗− e−ia−i + eiai
2ei
(23)
The proof is given in Appendix D. Note that the allocation solution satisfies
e−1 [f−1(a,A)− a−1] = e1 [f1(a,A)− a1] = g
∗− e−1a−1− e1a1
2
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that is, the incremental profit g∗− e−ia−i− eiai relative to the Nash equilibrium is divided equally
between the sellers.
5. Solution Approach
In this section, we present a solution method for the multiple-resource model described in Section 4.
Recall that we first solve the problem (18) to solve the second-stage Nash equilibrium problem
and that problem (18) can be solved efficiently if the matrix Ψ defined in (19) is positive definite.
Next consider the first stage problem (15). The expectation in (15) is taken with respect to the
probability distribution of the random data vector ξ. We assume that we can sample from that
distribution by using Monte Carlo sampling techniques and hence generate an independent and
identically distributed sample ξ1, . . . , ξN . Next we approximate the expectation with the sample
average and construct the following Sample Average Approximation (SAA) problem:
max
x∈Rk
{
fˆN(x) :=
∑N
n=1
[
V−1(x, ξn) +V1(x, ξn)
]}
s.t. bjxj ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , k
|lj| ≤ |xj| ≤ |uj| ∀ j = 1, . . . , k
(24)
Theoretical properties of the SAA approach have been studied extensively (e.g., Shapiro et al. 2009).
Under mild conditions, the optimal objective value and optimal solution of the SAA problem (24)
converge exponentially fast to the optimal objective value and optimal solution of the problem (15)
(cf., Shapiro and Xu 2008). The first-stage problem may not be convex and thus it may be hard to
solve problem (24) to optimality. For that reason, we may only ensure convergence to a stationary
point of the problem (15). Nevertheless, in our numerical experiments, solutions typically seem to
be stable and insensitive to the choice of starting point.
In order to solve the SAA problem (24) numerically, we need to compute derivatives ∇xVi(x, ξn)
of the first-stage objective functions Vi at a feasible point x and sample point ξ
n. Consider a feasible
point x and assume that Ψ is positive definite and that the second-stage problem has an equilibrium
point (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x)) (the equilibrium depends on ξ
n as well but the dependence is not shown in the
notation). Let (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x), λ
∗
−1(x), λ
∗
1(x)) be a solution of the system (16) of first order optimality
conditions (and thus (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x), λ
∗
−1(x), λ
∗
1(x)) is also a solution of the quadratic programming
problem (17)). Note that, since Ψ is positive definite, it holds that (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x)) is unique and is
a continuous function of x (e.g., Bonnans and Shapiro 2000).
Recall that Lagrange multipliers corresponding to inactive constraints are zeros. Let
Ii(yi, y−i, x) :=
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , k+mi} : [Wi (Eiyi−B−iy−i)− ηi− iMix]j = 0
}
denote the index set of active constraints of the problem (13). It is said that the strict complemen-
tarity condition holds at an equilibrium point (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x)) if among the corresponding Lagrange
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multiplier vectors λi, there exists at least one such that [λi]j > 0 for all j ∈ Ii(y∗i (x), y∗−i(x), x), for
i=±1, i.e., there are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the active constraints that are positive.
Now, suppose that the strict complementarity condition holds at (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x)), with [λ
∗
i (x)]j > 0
for all j ∈ Ii(y∗i (x), y∗−i(x), x), for i = ±1. Then for small perturbations dx of x, the active con-
straints remain active and the inactive constraints remain inactive. Therefore, by linearizing the
optimality conditions (16) at (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x), λ
∗
−1(x), λ
∗
1(x)), the following system of m−1 +m1 + 2k
linear equations in m−1 +m1 + 2k unknowns (dy−1, dy1, dλ−1, dλ1) is obtained:
Qidyi−B−idy−i−ETiW Ti dλi = 0, i=±1
[Wi (Eidyi−B−idy−i)− iMidx]j = 0, j ∈ Ii(y∗i (x), y∗−i(x), x), i=±1
[dλi]j = 0, j 6∈ Ii(y∗i (x), y∗−i(x), x), i=±1
(25)
Suppose that the linear system (25) is nonsingular. Then for any dx sufficiently small, the sys-
tem (25) has a unique solution and by the Implicit Function Theorem, the solution of (25)
gives the differential of (y∗−1(x), y
∗
1(x), λ
∗
−1(x), λ
∗
1(x)) at x. More specifically, the system (25)
can be written in the form S(dy−1, dy1, dλ−1, dλ1) = T dx, where S ∈ R(m−1+m1+2k)×(m−1+m1+2k)
and T ∈ R(m−1+m1+2k)×k. If S is nonsingular, then (dy−1, dy1, dλ−1, dλ1) = S−1T dx, and thus
∇(y∗−1(x), y∗1(x), λ∗−1(x), λ∗1(x)) = S−1T . It follows from (14) that
∇xVi(x, ξ) = ∇y∗i (x)TQiy∗i (x)−∇y∗i (x)TB−iy∗−i(x)−∇y∗−i(x)TBT−iy∗i (x)−∇y∗i (x)TCi (26)
∇2xxVi(x, ξ) = ∇y∗i (x)TQi∇y∗i (x)−∇y∗i (x)TB−i∇y∗−i(x)−∇y∗−i(x)TBT−i∇y∗i (x) (27)
can be calculated easily.
The analysis above shows that sufficient conditions for differentiability of Vi with respect to x
at (x, ξ) are the strict complementarity condition and nondegeneracy of the system (25). These
conditions are not necessary — for example, if Mi = 0 for i=±1, then Vi(x, ξ) is constant and hence
differentiable with respect to x. Also, the expectation operator often smooths nondifferentiable
functions. For example, if ∇xVi(x, ξ) exists for almost every ξ and a mild boundedness condition
holds, then E[Vi(x, ξ)] is differentiable at x and ∇xE[Vi(x, ξ)] = E[∇xVi(x, ξ)] (e.g., Shapiro et al.
2009, Theorem 7.44). The derivatives in (26) and (27) are used to solve SAA problems (24) with
a trust-region method. Numerical results are given in Section 6.
6. Numerical Examples
In this section, we present numerical results to compare profits in settings with an alliance, no
alliance, and perfect coordination. We present results for the network example given in Section 4.1.
We first provide the results for the deterministic case with known demand functions in Section 6.1,
and then present results for the stochastic case with random demand functions in Section 6.2.
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6.1. Deterministic Examples
We first describe how the input data Ei, Bi, and Ci for the numerical examples were chosen. For
the example network, m−1 =m1 = 20, and thus Ei,Bi ∈R20×20 and Ci ∈R20 for i=±1. For each
instance, a specific ratio r1 ∈ [0,1) is chosen such that |B−i,`,`′ |= r1|Ei,`,`′ |. Thus, r1 is similar to
the ratio γ/β of the two-resource example in Section 3.3 and represents the level of differentiation
between the sellers’ products (smaller ratios mean higher levels of differentiation). For all instances,
it was verified that the resulting matrix Ψ defined in (19) was positive definite.
For the no alliance setting, we used the transformations in Appendix C to obtain E˜i, B˜i, and C˜i.
In addition, we investigated the effect of a difference in product attractiveness between the settings
with and without an alliance. As mentioned, in a setting without an alliance, a buyer may have to
buy products from multiple sellers and combine them to obtain the product desired by the buyer.
Under an alliance a seller may offer the combined product to the buyer, making it more convenient
for the buyer to obtain the product (“one-stop shopping”). There may be additional ways in which
an alliance increases demand. For example, with a liner shipping alliance, the coordination of
connecting voyage schedules to reduce lay-over time or missed connections and rebooking cost may
further enhance the combined product under an alliance. This might increase the potential demand
level under an alliance compared to that under no alliance. Motivated by these observations, we
solved some instances in which the demands under no alliance is obtained using the transformations
in Appendix C, but with a reduction in the demand for products assembled from more than one
seller by a factor of r2 ∈ (0,1] (in the notation of that section, the part of the demand for products
in Li derived from the demand for products in L0,−1 ∪L0,1 was reduced by a factor of r2).
The two-stage alliance design problem (15) was solved using a trust region algorithm. At each
iteration, given the current value of the resource exchange vector x, the convex quadratic pro-
gram (17) was solved. It was verified that the optimal objective value of (17) was zero, that is, the
solution of (17) gave a solution of the second stage equilibrium problem (12) for i=±1. It was also
verified that the strict complimentary condition held and that the system (25) was nonsingular.
Next the derivatives of the objective function of (15) with respect to x could be computed, and the
trust region algorithm could execute the next iteration. As mentioned, the objective function of (15)
may not be convex. To address the concern of potential multiple local optima, we used 50 different
starting points x0 for the first iteration for each instance. In each scenario, all 50 starting points
led to similar final solutions and final objective values.
For the no alliance model, the second-stage equilibrium problem had to be solved only once for
each instance. For the perfect coordination model, the convex quadratic optimization problem (22)
also had to be solved only once for each instance.
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Table 4 Comparison of total profit for a resource exchange alliance, no alliance, and perfect coordination, for
different levels of product differentiation.
Deterministic Model
r1 = 0.2 r1 = 0.5 r1 = 0.8
Total Relative Total Relative Total Relative
(r2 = 1) Revenue increase (%) Revenue increase (%) Revenue increase (%)
No alliance 3180600 3227900 3269800
Perfect Coordination 3434300 7.98 3433400 6.37 3433000 4.99
Alliance 3432355 7.92 3416153 5.83 3363869 2.88
Table 5 Comparison of maximum achievable total revenue under different convenience level
Deterministic Model
r2 = 0.2 (High) r2 = 0.6 r2 = 1 (No Difference)
Total Relative Total Relative Total Relative
(r1 = 0.5) Revenue increase (%) Revenue increase (%) Revenue increase (%)
No alliance 3115900 3184500 3227900
Perfect Coordination 3433400 10.19 3433400 7.82 3433400 6.37
Alliance 3416153 9.64 3416173 7.27 3416153 5.83
Table 4 presents the total profits under different levels of product differentiation represented by
different values of r1 given r2 = 1 and with diagonal matrices Ei and Bi. The largest increase in
profits relative to the no alliance setting was obtained under high levels of product differentiation.
For example, when r1 = 0.2, an alliance increases the profit of the no alliance setting by 7.92%, and
perfect coordination increases the profit by 7.98%. Even under a low level of product differentiation
(r1 = 0.8), an alliance still increases the profit by 2.88%, and perfect coordination increases the
profit by 4.99%. Similar results were obtained with non-diagonal matrices.
In order to further investigate the impact of capacity and product differentiation level on the
competition and thus the potential profit improvement, we performed the experiments given dif-
ferent capacity levels and r1 values. In order to compare the results easily, we generated similar
plots to the ones given in Section 3.3 for the two-resource model. Here, there exists demand for a
product that consists of only one resource thus it represents more general cases. Figure 4 shows
a plot of the relative increase in total profit with an alliance over no alliance as a function of the
capacity bmin/α and the product differentiation level γ/β. The general insights remain same; the
relative increase is largest when the capacity is large and the product differentiation level is high.
Interestingly, in addition to the profit increase, we also found that the prices under no alliance is
generally higher than the price under an alliance as shown in Figure 5. These are consistent with
what we have observed in Section 3.3.
We also compared profits for different values of r2. Table 5 compares the total profits under
different levels of convenience represented by different values of r2 for r1 = 0.5 and with diagonal
matrices Ei and Bi. As expected, the relative increase in profit is larger for smaller values of r2.
6.2. Stochastic Examples
In this section, we present results for the stochastic model (that is, the first stage problem (15)
with expectation in the objective) presented in Section 4. The random data Ei, Bi, and Ci followed
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Figure 4 Plot of the relative increase in profit with an alliance over no alliance.
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Figure 5 Plot of the relative decrease in price with an alliance over no alliance.
a multivariate normal distribution with means as described in Section 6.1, standard deviations
proportional to the means, and correlation coefficients of 0.6.
We generated and solved SAA problems with different sample sizes N = 20,40, . . . ,500. At each
iteration of the first-stage problem, the second-stage problem was solved for each of the N sample
points ξn. Then, for each of the N sample points ξn, the derivatives of Vi(x, ξ
n) were computed as
given in (26) and (27). The averages of these derivatives over the N sample points then gave the
derivatives of the first-stage objective of the SAA problem (24).
Finally, after a resource exchange x was chosen by solving a SAA problem, we evaluated the
total profits in the alliance, no alliance, and perfect coordination settings with an independent and
identically distributed sample of 1000 sample points, independent of the samples used in the SAA
problem. Table 6 reports the number of iterations of the trust region algorithm until termination,
the resource exchange solution xopt at termination, the objective value (objopt) of the SAA problem
at xopt, and the gradient norm (‖g‖) of the SAA objective function at xopt, for different sample
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Table 6 Optimal solution under different sample sizes for the stochastic case
n iter objopt ‖g‖ xopt
20 41 -3409501 1.08E-04 1444 1550 1395 1480 -1501 -1586 -1393 -1523
100 39 -3408869 3.53E-05 1443 1549 1394 1479 -1503 -1585 -1393 -1525
300 43 -3409336 3.25E-05 1447 1553 1398 1483 -1499 -1582 -1388 -1521
500 41 -3413295 8.62E-05 1446 1553 1397 1482 -1500 -1582 -1389 -1522
a n: sample size
b iter: number of iterations when algorithm stopped
c objopt: objective function value at the optimal solution
d ‖g‖: gradient norm at the optimal solution
e xopt: optimal solution
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Figure 6 Histogram of the pairwise difference in total profit between an alliance and no alliance, using a
sample of 1000 sample points.
sizes N , for the network example in Section 4.1. As far as we know, these are the first stochastic
mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints motivated by an application that has been
solved reasonably.
Figure 6 presents a histogram of the pairwise difference in total profit between an alliance
and no alliance, using a sample of 1000 sample points, independent of the samples used in the
SAA problem. The total profit under an alliance was larger for all 1000 sample points, with the
percentage increase varying from 5.24% to 6.31%.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we presented an economic motivation for interest in alliances by showing that without
an alliance sellers will tend to price their products too high and sell too little, thereby foregoing
potential profit. We showed that under a resource exchange alliance, some of the foregone profit
can be captured. In fact, the relative increase is largest when the capacity is large and the product
differentiation level is high.
We formulated the problem of determining the optimal amounts of resources to exchange as
a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, taking the competition that results from
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alliance members selling similar products into account. In general, Mathematical Programs with
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) are extremely badly behaved, often because the lower level equi-
librium, if it exists, is discontinuous in the upper level decision. As a result MPECs are notoriously
intractable and stochastic MPECs are even more intractable. Our solution approach utilizeing a
trust region algorithm provides a method to search for an optimal exchange and the stochastic
MPECs for the alliance design problems could be solved reasonably well.
Many research questions regarding alliances remain. In this paper we consider one type of
alliances, namely resource exchange alliances. Such alliances are attractive because they do not
require complicated coordination after the resource exchange has taken place and do not raise anti-
trust concerns. since they enhance competition instead of reducing competition. However, there are
many other potential alliance structures of interest that remain to be analyzed and compared in
greater detail. In addition, the problem of optimal revenue management under an alliance is very
challenging and has not received much attention in the literature. Thus the problem of optimal
revenue management under an alliance remains to be addressed.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Results for Two-Resource Model
Appendix A.1: No Alliance
First consider the case in which bmin ≥ α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1) > 0 (it is shown later for which input parameter
values this condition holds). In this case the profit function of seller i is given by
g˜i(y˜i, y˜−i) = y˜i
[
α˜− β˜(y˜−i + y˜i)
]
Then the best response function of seller i is given by
Bi(y˜−i) =
α˜− β˜y˜−i
2β˜
Solving the system
y˜i =
α˜− β˜y˜−i
2β˜
for i=±1, the equilibrium (y˜∗−1, y˜∗1) is obtained, where
y˜∗i =
α˜
3β˜
> 0
The demand at the equilibrium prices (y˜∗−1, y˜
∗
1) is equal to
α˜− β˜(y˜∗−1 + y˜∗1) =
α˜
3
> 0 (28)
Therefore, if bmin ≥ α˜/3, then the equilibrium prices are given by (2), the equilibrium demand is given by (3),
the resulting profit of seller i is given by (4), and thus the total profit of both sellers together is given by (5).
Next, consider the case in which bmin ≤ α˜/3. Note that in this case α˜≥ 3bmin > bmin.
Case (1): First, consider any pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) such that y˜−1 + y˜1 < (α˜ − bmin)/β˜. In Figure 7, this
corresponds to (a). Then α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)> bmin > 0, and thus the profit of seller i is given by
g˜i(y˜i, y˜−i) = y˜ibmin
Thus, if y˜−1 + y˜1 < (α˜− bmin)/β˜, then the profit of seller i is increasing in y˜i, and hence such a pair of prices
(y˜−1, y˜1) cannot be an equilibrium.
Case (2): Next, consider any pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) such that y˜−1 + y˜1 ≥ α˜/β˜. In Figure 7, this corresponds
to (b). Then the demand and profit of each seller is zero.
Case (3.1): Next, consider any pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) such that α˜/β˜ > y˜−1+ y˜1 > (α˜−bmin)/β˜ and y˜−1+2y˜1 >
α˜/β˜. In Figure 7, this corresponds to (c). Then 0< α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)< bmin, and thus the profit of seller i is
given by
g˜i(y˜i, y˜−i) = y˜i
[
α˜− β˜(y˜−i + y˜i)
]
Note that
∂g˜1(y˜1, y˜−1)/∂y˜1 = α˜− β˜y˜−1− 2β˜y˜1 < 0
Thus, if α˜/β˜ > y˜−1 + y˜1 > (α˜− bmin)/β˜ and y˜−1 + 2y˜1 > α˜/β˜, then the profit of seller 1 is decreasing in y˜1,
and hence such a pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) cannot be an equilibrium.
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(a) Case 1: y˜−1 + y˜1 < (α˜− bmin)/β˜. (b) Case 2: y˜−1 + y˜1 ≥ α˜/β˜.
(c) Case 3.1: α˜/β˜ > y˜−1+ y˜1 > (α˜−bmin)/β˜ and y˜−1+
2y˜1 > α˜/β˜.
(d) Case 3.2: α˜/β˜ > y˜−1 + y˜1 > (α˜ − bmin)/β˜ and
2y˜−1 + y˜1 > α˜/β˜.
(e) Case 4: y˜−1+ y˜1 = (α˜−bmin)/β˜ and (y˜−1 < bmin/β˜
or y˜1 < bmin/β˜).
(f) Case 5: The line segment between (bmin/β˜, α˜/β˜−
2bmin/β˜) and (α˜/β˜− 2bmin/β˜, bmin/β˜).
Figure 7 Different regions of the pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) corresponding to different cases.
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Case (3.2): Next, consider any pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) such that α˜/β˜ > y˜−1+ y˜1 > (α˜−bmin)/β˜ and 2y˜−1+ y˜1 >
α˜/β˜. In Figure 7, this corresponds to (d). It follows similarly to Case 3.1 that the profit of seller −1 is
decreasing in y˜−1, and hence such a pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) cannot be an equilibrium.
Case (4.1): Next, consider any pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) such that y˜−1+ y˜1 = (α˜−bmin)/β˜ and 0≤ y˜−1 < bmin/β˜.
Note that α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1) = bmin, and thus the corresponding profit of seller −1 is given by
g˜−1(y˜−1, y˜1) = y˜−1bmin
Next, consider yˆ−1 :=
(
α˜/β˜− y˜1
)
/2. First, note that
y˜1 ≤ y˜−1 + y˜1 = α˜− bmin
β˜
<
α˜
β˜
⇒ α˜− β˜y˜1
2
> 0
⇔ α˜− β˜
(
α˜/β˜− y˜1
2
+ y˜1
)
> 0
⇔ α˜− β˜ (yˆ−1 + y˜1) > 0
Also, note that
y˜−1 < bmin/β˜
⇔ y˜−1 + (α˜− bmin)/β˜ < α˜/β˜
⇔ 2y˜−1 + y˜1 < α˜/β˜
⇔ y˜−1 < α˜/β˜− y˜1
2
= yˆ−1
and thus α˜− β˜ (yˆ−1 + y˜1)< α˜− β˜ (y˜−1 + y˜1) = bmin. Thus the corresponding profit of seller −1 is given by
g˜−1(yˆ−1, y˜1) = yˆ−1
[
α˜− β˜ (yˆ−1 + y˜1)
]
Next, note that
y˜−1 < bmin/β˜
⇒
(
bmin− β˜y˜−1
)2
> 0
⇔ b2min + 2bminβ˜y˜−1 + β˜2y˜2−1 > 4bminβ˜y˜−1
⇔
(
bmin + β˜y˜−1
)2
> 4β˜y˜−1bmin
⇔
(
bmin/β˜+ y˜−1
2
)(
bmin + β˜y˜−1
2
)
> y˜−1bmin
⇔
 α˜/β˜−
(
α˜/β˜− bmin/β˜− y˜−1
)
2
 α˜− β˜
(
α˜/β˜− bmin/β˜− y˜−1
)
2
 > y˜−1bmin
⇔
(
α˜/β˜− y˜1
2
)(
α˜− β˜y˜1
2
)
> y˜−1bmin
⇔
(
α˜/β˜− y˜1
2
)α˜− β˜
(
α˜/β˜− y˜1
)
2
− β˜y˜1
 > y˜−1bmin
⇔ yˆ−1
(
α˜− β˜yˆ−1− β˜y˜1
)
> y˜−1bmin
⇔ g˜−1(yˆ−1, y˜1) > g˜−1(y˜−1, y˜1)
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Thus such a pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) cannot be an equilibrium.
Case (4.2): Next, consider any pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) such that y˜−1 + y˜1 = (α˜− bmin)/β˜ and 0≤ y˜1 < bmin/β˜.
Consider yˆ1 :=
(
α˜/β˜− y˜−1
)
/2. It follows similarly to Case 4.1 that g˜1(yˆ1, y˜−1)> g˜1(y˜1, y˜−1) and thus such a
pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) cannot be an equilibrium. In Figure 7, Case (4.1) and Case (4.2) correspond to (e).
Case (5): The only remaining pairs of prices to check are pairs (y˜−1, y˜1) on the line segment between
(bmin/β˜, α˜/β˜− 2bmin/β˜) and (α˜/β˜− 2bmin/β˜, bmin/β˜). In Figure 7, this corresponds to the line segment on
(f). Consider any pair of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) = (1− γ)(bmin/β˜, α˜/β˜ − 2bmin/β˜) + γ(α˜/β˜ − 2bmin/β˜, bmin/β˜) for
γ ∈ [0,1]. It follows from bmin ≤ α˜/3 that 0< bmin/β˜ ≤ α˜/β˜− 2bmin/β˜, and thus y˜i > 0. Note that y˜−1 + y˜1 =
(1−γ)(α˜/β˜− bmin/β˜) +γ(α˜/β˜− bmin/β˜) = (α˜− bmin)/β˜, that y˜−1 + 2y˜1 = (1−γ)(2α˜/β˜−3bmin/β˜) +γα˜/β˜ ≥
α˜/β˜, where the inequality follows from bmin ≤ α˜/3, and similarly 2y˜−1 + y˜1 ≥ α˜/β˜. Then, for any yˆ1 < y˜1, it
holds that y˜−1 + yˆ1 < (α˜− bmin)/β˜, and thus it follows from Case (a) that g˜1(yˆ1, y˜−1)< g˜1(y˜1, y˜−1). Also, for
any yˆ1 > y˜1, it holds that y˜−1 + yˆ1 > (α˜− bmin)/β˜ and y˜−1 + 2yˆ1 > α˜/β˜, and thus it follows from Case (c)
that g˜1(yˆ1, y˜−1)< g˜1(y˜1, y˜−1). Hence, given y˜−1, y˜1 is the best response for seller 1. Similarly, given y˜1, y˜−1
is the best response for seller −1.
Therefore, if bmin ≤ α˜/3, then all pairs of prices (y˜−1, y˜1) on the line segment between (bmin/β˜, α˜/β˜ −
2bmin/β˜) and (α˜/β˜ − 2bmin/β˜, bmin/β˜) are equilibria. For all of these equilibrium prices total price is equal
to (α˜− bmin)/β˜, the demand is equal to bmin, the resulting profit of seller i is equal to y˜ibmin, and thus the
total profit of both sellers together is given by (6).
Appendix A.2: Perfect Coordination
In this section, we determine the maximum achievable total profit of the two sellers together, that is, the
total profit if the sellers would perfectly coordinate pricing.
The total profit of the two sellers is given by
g˜(y˜−1, y˜1) := (y˜−1 + y˜1) min{bmin, max{0, α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)}}
First consider the case in which bmin ≥ α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)> 0. In this case the total profit of the two sellers is
given by
g˜(y˜−1, y˜1) := (y˜−1 + y˜1)
[
α˜− β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)
]
The optimal total price y¯−1 + y¯1 that maximizes the total profit is given by
y¯−1 + y¯1 =
α˜
2β˜
> 0
The demand at the optimal total price y¯−1 + y¯1 is equal to
α˜− β˜(y¯−1 + y¯1) = α˜
2
>
α˜
3
= α˜− β˜(y˜∗−1 + y˜∗1) (29)
Therefore, if bmin ≥ α˜/2, then the optimal total price is given by (7), the corresponding demand is given
by (8), the total profit of both sellers together is given by (9), and the consumer surplus is given by (??).
Next, consider the case in which bmin ≤ α˜/2. In this case the optimal total price is given by
y˜−1 + y˜1 =
α˜− bmin
β˜
> 0
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with corresponding demand equal to bmin. The total profit of both sellers together is equal to
(y˜−1 + y˜1) bmin =
α˜− bmin
β˜
bmin
and the consumer surplus is equal to
1
2
[
α˜
β˜
− α˜− bmin
β˜
]
bmin =
b2min
2β˜
Appendix A.3: Resource Exchange Alliance
For given values of b−1 and b1, the feasible set S1 of two-resource products that can be sold by the two
sellers is given by S1 := {(q−1(x), q1(x)) : xi ∈ [0, bi], i = ±1}. Next we show that this set S1 is equal to
S2 := {(q−1, q1) ∈ [0, bmin]2 : q−1 + q1 ≤ bmin}. First, consider any (q−1(x), q1(x)) ∈ S1 with corresponding
(x−1, x1) ∈ [0, b−1] × [0, b1]. Without loss of generality, suppose that b−1 = bmin. Then q−1(x) + q1(x) =
min{b−1−x−1, x1}+ min{b1−x1, x−1} ≤ b−1−x−1 +x−1 = b−1 = bmin, and thus (q−1(x), q1(x))∈ S2. Next,
consider any (q−1, q1) ∈ S2. Choose xi = q−i for i=±1. Note that xi ∈ [0, bi] since q−i ∈ [0, bmin]. Also, xi =
q−i ≤ bmin− qi = bmin−x−i ≤ b−i−x−i, and thus q−i(x) = min{b−i−x−i, xi}= xi = q−i. Thus (q−1, q1)∈ S1,
and hence S1 = S2. Hence, the first-stage decision variables may be considered to be the resource exchange
quantities x = (x−1, x1) ∈ [0, b−1]× [0, b1], or equivalently the capacities q = (q−1, q1) ∈ S2 of two-resource
products after exchange.
Case 1. First consider the case in which qi >α−βyi+γy−i > 0 for i=±1 (it is considered later for which
input parameter values and values of q and y this condition holds). In this case the profit function of each
seller i is given by
gi(yi, y−i) = yi [α−βyi + γy−i]
Then the best response function of each seller i is given by
Bi(y−i) =
α+ γy−i
2β
Solving the system
yi =
α+ γy−i
2β
for i=±1, the equilibrium (y∗−1, y∗1) is obtained, where
y∗i =
α
2β− γ > 0 (30)
Note that the equilibrium prices are greater than the marginal cost c−1 + c1 of the two-resource product.
The demand at the equilibrium prices (y∗−1, y
∗
1) is equal to
α−βy∗i + γy∗−i =
αβ
2β− γ > 0 (31)
The resulting profit of each seller is equal to
y∗i min{qi, max{0, α−βy∗i + γy∗−i}} =
α2β
(2β− γ)2 (32)
and thus the total profit of both sellers together is equal to
2
α2β
(2β− γ)2 (33)
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J
K
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M
0
Figure 8 Different cases of capacity bmin for a resource exchange alliance.
Therefore, if qi ≥ αβ/(2β − γ) for i = ±1, then the equilibrium prices are given by (30), the equilibrium
demand is given by (31), the resulting profit of each seller is given by (32), and thus the total profit of both
sellers together is given by (33). Note that qi ≥ αβ/(2β−γ) for i=±1 requires that bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β−γ). Thus
the results above hold if bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β−γ) and the resource exchange x is chosen such that qi ≥ αβ/(2β−γ)
for i = ±1. In Figure 8, the line ABCD shows pairs (q−1, q1) such that q−1 + q1 = bmin > 2αβ/(2β − γ),
obtained with resource exchange x= (x−1, x1) such that xi = q−i = bmin− qi = bmin− x−i ≤ b−i− x−i. Thus,
for the given value of bmin > 2αβ/(2β− γ), the set of points (q−1, q1) such that qi ≥ αβ/(2β− γ) for i=±1
and q−1 + q1 ≤ bmin corresponds to triangle BCI. All corresponding resource exchanges x lead to sales of
two-resource products of αβ/(2β − γ) by each seller, corresponding to point I, and provide total profit of
2α2β/(2β− γ)2.
Case 2. Next, consider the case in which 0≤ q−i ≤ α−βy−i + γyi and qi >α−βyi + γy−i > 0 (as before,
it is considered later for which input parameter values and values of q and y this condition holds). In this
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case the profit function of seller −i is given by
g−i(y−i, yi) = y−iq−i
and the profit function of seller i is given by
gi(yi, y−i) = yi [α−βyi + γy−i]
Then the best response function of seller −i is given by
B−i(yi) = max{y−i : q−i ≤ α−βy−i + γyi} = α+ γyi− q−i
β
and the best response function of seller i is given by
Bi(y−i) =
α+ γy−i
2β
Solving the system
y−i =
α+ γyi− q−i
β
yi =
α+ γy−i
2β
the solution (y∗−1, y
∗
1) is obtained, where
y∗−i =
2αβ+αγ− 2βq−i
2β2− γ2
y∗i =
αβ+αγ− γq−i
2β2− γ2 (34)
(It is checked later under what conditions y∗−i, y
∗
i > 0 and (y
∗
−i, y
∗
i ) is the unique equilibrium.) The demands
at the prices (y∗−i, y
∗
i ) are equal to
d−i(y
∗
−i, y
∗
i ) = α−βy∗−i + γy∗i = q−i (35)
di(y
∗
i , y
∗
−i) = α−βy∗i + γy∗−i =
αβ(β+ γ)−βγq−i
2β2− γ2 (36)
Recall that we are considering the case in which q−i ≤ α−βy−i+γyi and qi >α−βyi+γy−i. Note that q−i =
α−βy∗−i+γy∗i . Also note that qi >α−βy∗i +γy∗−i if and only if qi >αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2−γ2).
Examples of the line qi = αβ(β + γ)/(2β
2 − γ2)− βγq−i/(2β2 − γ2) are given in Figure 8 by line LFI for
i = 1 and by line MGI for i = −1. It can be verified that the intercept satisfies αβ(β + γ)/(2β2 − γ2) ∈
(0,2αβ/(2β − γ)). The slope of the lines are negative if γ > 0 and positive if γ < 0. Note that if q−i =
αβ/(2β−γ), then αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2−γ2) = αβ/(2β−γ), and thus in all cases the lines go
through I = (αβ/(2β−γ), αβ/(2β−γ)). In Figure 8, if bmin > 2αβ/(2β−γ), such as in the case in which the
line ABCD shows pairs (q−1, q1) such that q−1+q1 = bmin, then the set of points (q−1, q1) such that 0≤ q−1 ≤
α− βy∗−1 + γy∗1, q1 > α− βy∗1 + γy∗−1, and q−1 + q1 ≤ bmin, corresponds to quadrilateral ABIL. (Note that
q−1 ≤ αβ/(2β−γ), since it has already been shown that q−1 >α−βy∗−1+γy∗1 in triangle BCI.) Similarly, the
set of points (q−1, q1) such that 0≤ q1 ≤ α−βy∗1+γy∗−1, q−1 >α−βy∗−1+γy∗1, and q−1+q1 ≤ bmin, corresponds
to quadrilateral DCIM (note that q1 ≤ αβ/(2β− γ)). If αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)< bmin ≤ 2αβ/(2β− γ), such
as in the case in which the line EFGH shows pairs (q−1, q1) such that q−1 + q1 = bmin, then the set of
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points (q−1, q1) such that 0≤ q−1 ≤ α−βy∗−1 +γy∗1, q1 >α−βy∗1 +γy∗−1, and q−1 + q1 ≤ bmin, corresponds to
triangle EFL, and the set of points (q−1, q1) such that 0≤ q1 ≤ α− βy∗1 + γy∗−1, q−1 >α− βy∗−1 + γy∗1, and
q−1 + q1 ≤ bmin, corresponds to triangle HGM . It is verified in Case 3 that, if bmin ≤ αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2),
then qi ≤ α−βy∗i + γy∗−i for i=±1.
Next we verify that, if q−i ≤ αβ/(2β − γ), then the prices y∗−i, y∗i given in (34) satisfy y∗−i, y∗i > 0, that
is, the prices are greater than the marginal cost c−1 + c1 of the two-resource product. First note that the
denominator in the expressions for y∗−i and y
∗
i is positive. Next consider the numerator in the expression for
y∗−i. Note that
2β2 < 4β2− γ2 = (2β+ γ)(2β− γ)
⇔ αβ
2β− γ <
2αβ+αγ
2β
Thus, if q−i ≤ αβ/(2β− γ), then
q−i <
2αβ+αγ
2β
⇔ 0 < 2αβ+αγ− 2βq−i
⇔ 0 < 2αβ+αγ− 2βq−i
2β2− γ2 = y
∗
−i
Next consider the numerator in the expression for y∗i . If γ ≤ 0, then α(β + γ)− γq−i > 0 (recall that γ ∈
(−β,β)), and thus
y∗i =
αβ+αγ− γq−i
2β2− γ2 > 0
Next, consider the case with γ > 0. Note that
αβ
2β− γ <
αβ
γ
<
αβ+αγ
γ
Thus, if q−i ≤ αβ/(2β− γ), then
q−i <
αβ+αγ
γ
⇔ 0 < αβ+αγ− γq−i
⇔ 0 < αβ+αγ− γq−i
2β2− γ2 = y
∗
i
Next we verify that, if q−i ≤ αβ/(2β−γ) and qi >αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2−γ2), then (y∗−i, y∗i )
given in (34) is the unique equilibrium. First, recall that Bi(y−i) = (α+γy−i)/(2β) is the unique best response
for seller i if the capacity qi of seller i is not constraining. Note that if seller −i chooses price y∗−i and
qi > αβ(β + γ)/(2β
2 − γ2)− βγq−i/(2β2 − γ2), then the capacity qi of seller i is not constraining, and thus
y∗i given in (34) is the unique best response for seller i to y
∗
−i. Next we verify that y
∗
−i given in (34) is the
unique best response for seller −i to y∗i . Given y∗i , the profit of seller −i is given by
g−i(y−i, y
∗
i ) = y−imin{q−i, max{0, α−βy−i + γy∗i }}
=

y−iq−i if y−i ≤ α+γy
∗
i−q−i
β
y−i (α−βy−i + γy∗i ) if α+γy
∗
i−q−i
β
≤ y−i ≤ α+γy
∗
i
β
0 if y−i ≥ α+γy
∗
i
β
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Thus g−i(y−i, y∗i ) is a nondecreasing linear function of y−i if y−i ≤ (α+ γy∗i − q−i)/β. If (α+ γy∗i − q−i)/β <
y−i < (α+ γy∗i )/β, then g−i(y−i, y
∗
i ) is a concave quadratic function of y−i, with
g′−i(y−i, y
∗
i ) = −2βy−i +α+ γy∗i
< −2 (α+ γy∗i − q−i) +α+ γy∗i
= −α− γy∗i + 2q−i
= −α− γ αβ+αγ− γq−i
2β2− γ2 + 2q−i
=
−2αβ2−αβγ+ (4β2− γ2)q−i
2β2− γ2
Note that
−2αβ2−αβγ+ (4β2− γ2)q−i
2β2− γ2 ≤ 0
⇔ −2αβ2−αβγ+ (4β2− γ2)q−i ≤ 0
⇔ −αβ(2β+ γ) + (2β− γ)(2β+ γ)q−i ≤ 0
⇔ −αβ+ (2β− γ)q−i ≤ 0
⇔ q−i ≤ αβ
2β− γ
Hence, if q−i ≤ αβ/(2β − γ), then g′−i(y−i, y∗i )< 0 for all y−i ∈ ((α+ γy∗i − q−i)/β, (α+ γy∗i )/β). Hence, the
unique best response for seller −i to y∗i is B−i(y∗i ) = (α+ γy∗i − q−i)/β. Therefore, if q−i ≤ αβ/(2β− γ) and
qi >αβ(β+ γ)/(2β
2− γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2− γ2), then (y∗−i, y∗i ) given in (34) is the unique equilibrium.
The resulting profit of each seller is equal to
g−i(y
∗
−i, y
∗
i ) = y
∗
−iq−i
=
α (2β+ γ) q−i− 2βq2−i
2β2− γ2
gi(y
∗
i , y
∗
−i) = y
∗
i
(
α−βy∗i + γy∗−i
)
=
(
αβ+αγ− γq−i
2β2− γ2
)(
αβ (β+ γ)−βγq−i
2β2− γ2
)
=
α2β (β+ γ)
2− 2αβγ (β+ γ) q−i +βγ2q2−i
(2β2− γ2)2 (37)
and thus the total profit of both sellers together is equal to
G(q−i) =
α (2β+ γ) q−i− 2βq2−i
2β2− γ2 +
α2β (β+ γ)
2− 2αβγ (β+ γ) q−i +βγ2q2−i
(2β2− γ2)2
=
α (2β+ γ) (2β2− γ2) q−i− 2β (2β2− γ2) q2−i +α2β (β+ γ)2− 2αβγ (β+ γ) q−i +βγ2q2−i
(2β2− γ2)2
=
α2β (β+ γ)
2
+α (4β3− 4βγ2− γ3) q−i−β (4β2− 3γ2) q2−i
(2β2− γ2)2 (38)
Therefore, if q−i ≤ αβ/(2β − γ) and qi > αβ(β + γ)/(2β2 − γ2) − βγq−i/(2β2 − γ2), then the equilibrium
prices are given by (34), the equilibrium demand is given by (36), the resulting profit of each seller is given
by (37), and thus the total profit of both sellers together is given by (38).
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Case 3. Next consider the case in which 0 ≤ qi ≤ α − βyi + γy−i for i = ±1. (It will be shown that
this case holds if and only if 0 ≤ qi ≤ αβ(β + γ)/(2β2 − γ2) − βγq−i/(2β2 − γ2) for i = ±1. In Figure 8
this case corresponds to two-resource product capacities (q−1, q1) in region 0LIM . Thus the entire region
{(q−1, q1) : qi ≥ 0, i=±1} is covered by Cases 1–3.) In this case the profit function of each seller i is given
by
gi(yi, y−i) = yiqi
Then the best response function of each seller i is given by
Bi(y−i) = max{yi : qi ≤ α−βyi + γy−i} = α+ γy−i− qi
β
Solving the system
yi =
α+ γy−i− qi
β
for i=±1, the equilibrium (y∗−1, y∗1) is obtained, where
y∗i =
α(β+ γ)−βqi− γq−i
β2− γ2 (39)
(It is checked later under what conditions y∗i > 0 and (y
∗
−1, y
∗
1) is the unique equilibrium.) The demand of
seller i at the prices (y∗−1, y
∗
1) is equal to
α−βy∗i + γy∗−i = qi > 0 (40)
Next we verify that, if qi ≤ αβ(β + γ)/(2β2 − γ2) − βγq−i/(2β2 − γ2) for i = ±1, then the prices y∗i
given in (39) satisfy y∗i > 0 for i = ±1, that is, the prices are greater than the marginal cost c−1 + c1 of
the two-resource product. Note that qi ≤ αβ(β + γ)/(2β2 − γ2)− βγq−i/(2β2 − γ2) for i=±1 implies that
q−1 + q1 ≤ 2αβ/(2β − γ). For a given pair (q−1, q1) such that qi ≤ αβ(β + γ)/(2β2− γ2)− βγq−i/(2β2− γ2)
for i=±1, consider the line with slope −1 through the point (q−1, q1). For example, in Figure 8, EFGH is
such a line, with points (q−1, q1) on line segment FG satisfying qi ≤ αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2−γ2)
for i=±1; and JK is also such a line, with all points (q−1, q1) on line segment JK satisfying qi ≤ αβ(β +
γ)/(2β2− γ2)− βγq−i/(2β2− γ2) for i=±1. We show that the prices y∗i given by (39) corresponding to all
points (q−1, q1) on line segment FG satisfy y∗i > 0. It follows that the prices y
∗
i given by (39) corresponding to
all points (q−1, q1) on line segment JK also satisfy y∗i > 0. The coordinates of point F are ([(2β
2−γ2)(q−1 +
q1)−αβ(β+γ)]/(2β2−βγ−γ2), [αβ(β+γ)−βγ(q−1 + q1)]/(2β2−βγ−γ2)) and the coordinates of point G
are ([αβ(β+γ)−βγ(q−1+q1)]/(2β2−βγ−γ2), [(2β2−γ2)(q−1+q1)−αβ(β+γ)]/(2β2−βγ−γ2)). Consider
the prices y∗i given in (39). Note that
y∗i =
α(β+ γ)−βqi− γq−i
β2− γ2 > 0
⇔ α(β+ γ)−βqi− γq−i > 0
⇔ βqi + γ(q−i + qi− qi) < α(β+ γ)
⇔ (β− γ)qi + γ(q−i + qi) < α(β+ γ) (41)
42
If (q−1, q1) is on line segment FG, then
qi ≤ αβ(β+ γ)−βγ(q−1 + q1)
2β2−βγ− γ2
⇔ (β− γ)qi + γ(q−i + qi) ≤ (β− γ)αβ(β+ γ)−βγ(q−1 + q1)
2β2−βγ− γ2 + γ(q−i + qi)
=
αβ3−αβγ2 +β2γ(q−1 + q1)− γ3(q−i + qi)
2β2−βγ− γ2
=
αβ(β2− γ2) + (β2− γ2)γ(q−1 + q1)
2β2−βγ− γ2
=
(β− γ)(β+ γ)[αβ+ γ(q−1 + q1)]
(β− γ)(2β+ γ)
=
(β+ γ)[αβ+ γ(q−1 + q1)]
2β+ γ
(42)
Next, by separately considering the cases γ ≤ 0 and γ ≥ 0, we show that [αβ + γ(q−1 + q1)]/(2β + γ) < α,
then it follows from (42) that (β− γ)qi + γ(q−i + qi)<α(β+ γ), and hence it follows from (41) that y∗i > 0.
First, suppose that γ ≤ 0. Note that
−γ < β
⇔ β < 2β+ γ
⇔ αβ
2β+ γ
< α
⇒ αβ+ γ(q−1 + q1)
2β+ γ
< α (43)
The last step follows since γ ≤ 0 and q−1 + q1 ≥ 0. It follows from (41), (42) and (43) that, if γ ≤ 0, then
y∗i > 0.
Next, suppose that γ ≥ 0. Note that
γ < β
⇔ β < 2β− γ
⇔ αβ(2β− γ+ 2γ)
(2β− γ)(2β+ γ) < α
⇔ αβ+
2αβγ
2β−γ
2β+ γ
< α
⇒ αβ+ γ(q−1 + q1)
2β+ γ
< α (44)
The last step follows since γ ≥ 0 and q−1 + q1 ≤ 2αβ/(2β − γ). It follows from (41), (42) and (44) that, if
γ ≥ 0, then y∗i > 0.
Next we verify that, if qi ≤ αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2−γ2) for i=±1, then (y∗−1, y∗1) given in (39)
is the unique equilibrium. We verify that y∗i given in (39) is the unique best response for seller i to y
∗
−i. Given
y∗−i, the profit of seller i is given by
gi(yi, y
∗
−i) = yimin
{
qi, max{0, α−βyi + γy∗−i}
}
=

yiqi if yi ≤ α+γy
∗
−i−qi
β
yi
(
α−βyi + γy∗−i
)
if
α+γy∗−i−qi
β
≤ yi ≤ α+γy
∗
−i
β
0 if yi ≥ α+γy
∗
−i
β
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Thus gi(yi, y
∗
−i) is a nondecreasing linear function of yi if yi ≤ (α+ γy∗−i− qi)/β. If (α+ γy∗−i− qi)/β < yi <
(α+ γy∗−i)/β, then gi(yi, y
∗
−i) is a concave quadratic function of yi, with
g′i(yi, y
∗
−i) = −2βyi +α+ γy∗−i
< −2 (α+ γy∗−i− qi)+α+ γy∗−i
= −α− γy∗−i + 2qi
= −α− γ α(β+ γ)−βq−i− γqi
β2− γ2 + 2qi
=
−αβ2−αβγ+βγq−i + (2β2− γ2)qi
β2− γ2
If (q−1, q1) is on line segment FG, then
qi ≤ αβ(β+ γ)−βγ(q−i + qi)
2β2−βγ− γ2
⇔ 0 ≥ −αβ2−αβγ+βγ(q−i + qi) + (2β2−βγ− γ2)qi
= −αβ2−αβγ+βγq−i + (2β2− γ2)qi
⇔ 0 ≥ −αβ
2−αβγ+βγq−i + (2β2− γ2)qi
β2− γ2
⇔ g′i(yi, y∗−i) < 0
Hence, if (q−1, q1) is on line segment FG, then g′i(yi, y
∗
−i)< 0 for all yi ∈ ((α+ γy∗−i − qi)/β, (α+ γy∗−i)/β).
Hence, the unique best response for seller i to y∗−i is Bi(y
∗
−i) = (α + γy
∗
−i − qi)/β. It follows in the same
way that if (q−1, q1) is on line segment JK, then the unique best response for seller i to y∗−i is Bi(y
∗
−i) =
(α+γy∗−i− qi)/β. Therefore, if qi ≤ αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2−γ2) for i=±1, then (y∗−1, y∗1) given
in (39) is the unique equilibrium.
The resulting profit of each seller i is equal to
y∗i min{qi, max{0, α−βy∗i + γy∗−i}} =
α(β+ γ)qi−βq2i − γq−iqi
β2− γ2 (45)
and thus the total profit of both sellers together is equal to
α(β+ γ)(q−1 + q1)−β(q2−1 + q21)− 2γq−1q1
β2− γ2 (46)
Therefore, if qi ≤ αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2− γ2) for i=±1, then the equilibrium prices are given
by (39), the equilibrium demand is given by (40), the resulting profit of each seller is given by (45), and thus
the total profit of both sellers together is given by (46).
Next we determine the value of (q−1, q1) that maximizes the total profit of both sellers together under
Case 3. First we fix the value of q−1 + q1 at some value q≤ bmin, and choose q1 to maximize the total profit
subject to q−1 + q1 = q. Thereafter we choose q to maximize the total profit subject to q ≤ bmin. It follows
from (46) that the total profit is equal to
α(β+ γ)(q−1 + q1)−β(q2−1 + q21)− 2γq−1q1
β2− γ2 =
α(β+ γ)(q−1 + q1)−β(q2−1 + 2q−1q1 + q21) + 2βq−1q1− 2γq−1q1
β2− γ2
=
α(β+ γ)q−βq2 + 2(β− γ)(q− q1)q1
β2− γ2
=
α(β+ γ)q−βq2 + 2(β− γ)qq1− 2(β− γ)q21
β2− γ2
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Let
H1(q1) :=
α(β+ γ)q−βq2 + 2(β− γ)qq1− 2(β− γ)q21
β2− γ2
Note that H1 is a concave quadratic function that is maximized at q
∗
1 = q/2, and the corresponding value of
q−1 is also q∗−1 = q/2. Recall that (46) applies if qi ≤ αβ(β + γ)/(2β2 − γ2)− βγq−i/(2β2 − γ2) for i=±1.
Note that
q∗i ≤
αβ(β+ γ)
2β2− γ2 −
βγ
2β2− γ2 q
∗
−i for i=±1
⇔ q
2
≤ αβ(β+ γ)
2β2− γ2 −
βγ
2β2− γ2
q
2
⇔ q ≤ 2αβ
2β− γ
Next we choose q to maximize the total profit subject to q≤ bmin and q≤ 2αβ/(2β− γ). Let
H2(q) := H1(q/2)
=
α(β+ γ)q−βq2 + 2(β− γ)q2/2− 2(β− γ)q2/4
β2− γ2
=
2α(β+ γ)q− (β+ γ)q2
2(β− γ)(β+ γ)
=
2αq− q2
2(β− γ)
Note that H2 is a concave quadratic function and H
′
2(q
∗) = 0⇔ q∗ = α. Also note that q∗ = α≤ 2αβ/(2β−γ)
if and only if γ ≥ 0. Let amin := min{α, bmin,2αβ/(2β− γ)}. Then the value of (q−1, q1) that maximizes the
total profit and that satisfies qi ≤ αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)−βγq−i/(2β2− γ2) for i=±1, is q∗−1 = q∗1 = amin/2.
The corresponding total profit is H2(amin) = (2α− amin)amin/[2(β− γ)]. This concludes Case 3.
Optimal exchange. Next, we compare the profits under Cases 1, 2, and 3, and determine the value of
(q−1, q1), that is, the value of the exchange x = (x−1, x1), that maximizes the total profit of both sellers
together. Different cases hold, depending on the capacity ratio bmin/α and the price coefficient ratio γ/β
(recall that γ/β ∈ (−1,1)). The different cases are depicted in Figure 9.
Case A (small capacity). bmin/α≤ [1 + γ/β]/[2− (γ/β)2], that is, bmin ≤ αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2):
In Figure 8, line JK shows an example of pairs (q−1, q1) such that q−1 + q1 = bmin for a given value of
bmin < αβ(β + γ)/(2β
2 − γ2), and triangle 0JK shows pairs (q−1, q1)≥ 0 such that q−1 + q1 ≤ bmin. In this
case, the capacity bmin is so small that all feasible values of (q−1, q1) correspond to Case 3. Recall that
αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)∈ (0,2αβ/(2β− γ)).
Case A1. γ/β ≤ 0 and bmin/α≤ [1 + γ/β]/[2− (γ/β)2], that is, γ ≤ 0 and bmin ≤ αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2):
Recall that 2αβ/(2β−γ)≤ α if and only if γ ≤ 0. Since bmin ≤ αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)< 2αβ/(2β−γ)≤ α, it
follows that bmin = min{α, bmin,2αβ/(2β−γ)}, and thus the value of (q−1, q1) that maximizes the total profit
is q∗−1 = q
∗
1 = bmin/2, and the maximum total profit is (2α− bmin)bmin/[2(β − γ)]. The resulting equilibrium
price of each seller, given by (39), is y∗i = (2α− bmin)/[2(β − γ)], and the resulting equilibrium demand of
each seller, given by (40), is equal to q∗i = bmin/2.
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1
2
3
1
2
bmin
α
1−1 γ
β
0
0
1
2
B1
B2
A1
A2
C1
C2
β(β + γ)
2β2 − γ2
2αβ
2β − γ
≈ 0.618
Figure 9 Different cases of the capacity ratio bmin/α and the price coefficient ratio γ/β.
Case A2. γ/β ≥ 0 and bmin/α≤ [1 + γ/β]/[2− (γ/β)2], that is, γ ≥ 0 and bmin ≤ αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2):
In this case, bmin ≤ αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)< 2αβ/(2β−γ) and α≤ 2αβ/(2β−γ). If αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)≤
α, then bmin ≤ α and thus bmin = min{α, bmin,2αβ/(2β − γ)}, the value of (q−1, q1) that maximizes the
total profit is q∗−1 = q
∗
1 = bmin/2, and the maximum total profit is (2α− bmin)bmin/[2(β − γ)]. The resulting
equilibrium price of each seller, given by (39), is y∗i = (2α− bmin)/[2(β − γ)], and the resulting equilibrium
demand of each seller, given by (40), is equal to q∗i = bmin/2. Note that αβ(β+γ)/(2β
2−γ2)≤ α if and only
if γ/β ≤ (√5− 1)/2 = 1/ϕ=ϕ− 1≈ 0.618, where ϕ denotes the golden ratio. If γ/β > (√5− 1)/2 (and thus
α < αβ(β + γ)/(2β2 − γ2)), then there are two possibilities. If bmin ≤ α, then as before, q∗−1 = q∗1 = bmin/2,
the equilibrium price of each seller is y∗i = (2α− bmin)/[2(β − γ)], the equilibrium demand of each seller is
equal to q∗i = bmin/2, and the maximum total profit is (2α− bmin)bmin/[2(β − γ)]. Otherwise, if α < bmin,
then q∗−1 = q
∗
1 = α/2, the resulting equilibrium price of each seller, given by (39), is y
∗
i = α/[2(β − γ)], the
resulting equilibrium demand of each seller, given by (40), is equal to q∗i = α/2, and the maximum total
profit is (2α−α)α/[2(β−γ)] = α2/[2(β−γ)]. Note that in this case the optimal resource exchange x∗ is such
that q∗−1 + q
∗
1 = α< bmin, that is, some capacity is not used.
Case B (intermediate capacity). [1+γ/β]/[2−(γ/β)2]≤ bmin/α≤ 2/(2−γ/β), that is, αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−
γ2)≤ bmin ≤ 2αβ/(2β− γ):
In Figure 8, line EFGH shows an example of pairs (q−1, q1) such that q−1 + q1 = bmin for a given value of
bmin ∈ (αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2), 2αβ/(2β−γ)), and triangle 0EH shows pairs (q−1, q1)≥ 0 such that q−1+q1 ≤
bmin. In this case with intermediate capacity bmin, there are feasible values of (q−1, q1) corresponding to
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Case 3, for example in pentagon 0LFGM in Figure 8, and there are feasible values of (q−1, q1) corresponding
to Case 2, for example in triangles EFL and GHM in Figure 8.
Consider any two pairs (q−1, q1) and (q′−1, q
′
1) in triangle EFL such that q−1 = q
′
−1. It follows from (34),
(36), (37), and (38) that the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium demand, the profit of each seller, and thus
the total profit of both sellers together are the same for (q−1, q1) and (q′−1, q
′
1). Therefore, for any point
(q−1, q1) in triangle EFL, there is a point (q−1, αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)−βγq−1/(2β2− γ2)) on the boundary
LF between triangle EFL and pentagon 0LFGM with the same total profit as at point (q−1, q1). Next, we
show that the total profit as a function of (q−1, q1) is continuous on the boundary between triangle EFL
and pentagon 0LFGM . Recall from (46) that the total profit at a point (q−1, q1) in pentagon 0LFGM is
equal to
α(β+ γ) (q−1 + q1)−β
(
q2−1 + q
2
1
)− 2γq−1q1
β2− γ2
Specifically, at the boundary point (q−1, αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)− βγq−1/(2β2− γ2)) the total profit is equal
to
α(β+ γ)
(
q−1 +
αβ(β+γ)−βγq−1
2β2−γ2
)
−β
(
q2−1 +
[
αβ(β+γ)−βγq−1
2β2−γ2
]2)
− 2γq−1 αβ(β+γ)−βγq−12β2−γ2
β2− γ2
=

[α2β(β+ γ)2 (2β2− γ2)−α2β3(β+ γ)2]
+
[
α(β+ γ) (2β2− γ2)2−αβγ(β+ γ) (2β2− γ2) + 2αβ3γ(β+ γ)− 2αβγ(β+ γ) (2β2− γ2)
]
q−1
+
[
−β (2β2− γ2)2−β3γ2 + 2βγ2 (2β2− γ2)
]
q2−1

(2β2− γ2)2 (β2− γ2)
=
 α
2β (2β2− γ2−β2) (β+ γ)2
+α (4β4− 4β2γ2 + γ4− 2β3γ+βγ3 + 2β3γ− 4β3γ+ 2βγ3) (β+ γ)q−1
−β (4β4− 4β2γ2 + γ4 +β2γ2− 4β2γ2 + 2γ4) q2−1

(2β2− γ2)2 (β2− γ2)
=
 α
2β (β2− γ2) (β+ γ)2
+α (4β4− 4β3γ− 4β2γ2 + 3βγ3 + γ4) (β+ γ)q−1
−β (4β4− 7β2γ2 + 3γ4) q2−1

(2β2− γ2)2 (β2− γ2)
=
 α
2β (β− γ) (β+ γ)3
+α (4β3− 4βγ2− γ3) (β− γ) (β+ γ)q−1
−β (4β2− 3γ2) (β− γ) (β+ γ)q2−1

(2β2− γ2)2 (β− γ) (β+ γ)
=
α2β(β+ γ)2 +α (4β3− 4βγ2− γ3) q−1−β (4β2− 3γ2) q2−1
(2β2− γ2)2
which is the same as the total profit given by (38) for point (q−1, αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)−βγq−1/(2β2−γ2)) in
triangle EFL. Thus the total profit as a function of (q−1, q1) is continuous on the boundary between triangle
EFL and pentagon 0LFGM . The same observation applies to the total profit as a function of (q−1, q1)
in triangle GHM . Hence, in Case B with intermediate capacity, it is sufficient to optimize (q−1, q1) over
pentagon 0LFGM only, that is, it is sufficient to restrict attention to feasible values of (q−1, q1) corresponding
to Case 3. The rest of Case B follows in the same way as for Case A with small capacity.
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Case B1. γ/β ≤ 0 and [1+γ/β]/[2− (γ/β)2]≤ bmin/α≤ 2/(2−γ/β), that is, γ ≤ 0 and αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−
γ2)≤ bmin ≤ 2αβ/(2β− γ):
Consider the optimal value of (q−1, q1) in pentagon 0LFGM . Since bmin ≤ 2αβ/(2β − γ) ≤ α, it follows
that bmin = min{α, bmin,2αβ/(2β−γ)}, and thus the value of (q−1, q1) in pentagon 0LFGM that maximizes
the total profit is q∗−1 = q
∗
1 = bmin/2, and the maximum total profit is (2α−bmin)bmin/[2(β−γ)]. The resulting
equilibrium price of each seller is y∗i = (2α− bmin)/[2(β− γ)], and the resulting equilibrium demand of each
seller is equal to q∗i = bmin/2.
Case B2. γ/β ≥ 0 and [1+γ/β]/[2− (γ/β)2]≤ bmin/α≤ 2/(2−γ/β), that is, γ ≥ 0 and αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−
γ2)≤ bmin ≤ 2αβ/(2β− γ):
If γ/β ≥ (√5−1)/2 (and thus α≤ αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)), then α= min{α, bmin,2αβ/(2β−γ)}, the value of
(q−1, q1) that maximizes the total profit is q∗−1 = q
∗
1 = α/2, and the maximum total profit is (2α−α)α/[2(β−
γ)] = α2/[2(β − γ)]. The resulting equilibrium price of each seller, given by (39), is y∗i = α/[2(β − γ)], and
the resulting equilibrium demand of each seller, given by (40), is equal to q∗i = α/2. In this case the optimal
resource exchange x∗ is such that q∗−1 + q
∗
1 = α≤ bmin, that is, some capacity is not used. If γ/β < (
√
5−1)/2
(and thus α>αβ(β+γ)/(2β2−γ2)), then there are two possibilities. If α≤ bmin, then as before, q∗−1 = q∗1 =
α/2, the equilibrium price of each seller is y∗i = α/[2(β− γ)], the equilibrium demand of each seller is equal
to q∗i = α/2, and the maximum total profit is α
2/[2(β − γ)]. Otherwise, if bmin ≤ α, then q∗−1 = q∗1 = bmin/2,
the equilibrium price of each seller is y∗i = (2α− bmin)/[2(β − γ)], the equilibrium demand of each seller is
equal to q∗i = bmin/2, and the maximum total profit is (2α− bmin)bmin/[2(β− γ)].
Case C (large capacity). bmin/α≥ 2/(2− γ/β), that is, bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β− γ):
In Figure 8, line ABCD shows an example of pairs (q−1, q1) such that q−1 + q1 = bmin for a given value of
bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β− γ), and triangle 0AD shows pairs (q−1, q1)≥ 0 such that q−1 + q1 ≤ bmin. In this case with
large capacity bmin, there are feasible values of (q−1, q1) in quadrilateral 0LIM in Figure 8 corresponding to
Case 3, there are feasible values of (q−1, q1) corresponding to Case 2, for example in quadrilaterals ABIL
and DCIM in Figure 8, and there are feasible values of (q−1, q1) corresponding to Case 1, for example in
triangle BCI in Figure 8.
For any point (q−1, q1) in ABIL, there is a point (q−1, αβ(β+ γ)/(2β2− γ2)− βγq−1/(2β2− γ2)) on the
boundary IL between ABIL and 0LIM with the same total profit as at point (q−1, q1). It was shown under
Case B that the total profit as a function of (q−1, q1) is continuous on the boundary. The same observation
applies to the total profit as a function of (q−1, q1) in DCIM . Hence, in Case C with large capacity, it is
sufficient to optimize (q−1, q1) over quadrilateral 0LIM and triangle BCI only, that is, it is sufficient to
restrict attention to feasible values of (q−1, q1) corresponding to Case 3 and Case 1.
Case C1. γ/β ≤ 0 and bmin/α≥ 2/(2− γ/β), that is, γ ≤ 0 and bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β− γ):
Since 2αβ/(2β − γ)≤ α and bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β − γ), it follows that 2αβ/(2β − γ) = min{α, bmin,2αβ/(2β −
γ)}, and thus the value of (q−1, q1) that maximizes the total profit over 0LIM is given by q∗−1 = q∗1 =
αβ/(2β − γ) represented by point I, and the corresponding total profit is (2α− 2αβ/(2β − γ))2αβ/(2β −
γ)/[2(β − γ)] = 2α2β/(2β − γ)2. Also, as shown in Case 1, all values of (q−1, q1) in triangle BCI have the
same total profit of 2α2β/(2β−γ)2. Thus, any point (q−1, q1) in triangle BCI represents an optimal resource
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exchange for Case C1. For all such optimal resource exchanges, the resulting equilibrium price of each seller,
given by both (30) and (39), is y∗i = α/(2β− γ), and the resulting equilibrium demand of each seller, given
by both (31) and (40), is equal to αβ/(2β− γ).
Case C2. γ/β ≥ 0 and bmin/α≥ 2/(2− γ/β), that is, γ ≥ 0 and bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β− γ):
Since bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β − γ) ≥ α, it follows that α = min{α, bmin,2αβ/(2β − γ)}, and thus the value of
(q−1, q1) that maximizes the total profit over 0LIM is q∗−1 = q
∗
1 = α/2, and the corresponding total profit is
(2α−α)α/[2(β− γ)] = α2/[2(β− γ)]. Also, all values of (q−1, q1) in triangle BCI have the same total profit
of 2α2β/(2β− γ)2. Note that
4β2− 4βγ+ γ2 ≥ 4β2− 4βγ
⇒ (2β− γ)2 ≥ 4β(β− γ)
⇒ α
2
2(β− γ) ≥
2α2β
(2β− γ)2
Thus the optimal point for Case C2 is q∗−1 = q
∗
1 = α/2, and the maximum total profit is α
2/[2(β − γ)]. The
resulting equilibrium price of each seller, given by (39), is y∗i = α/[2(β − γ)], and the resulting equilibrium
demand of each seller, given by (40), is equal to q∗i = α/2.
Inspection of the results above for the settings with no alliance, perfect coordination, and a resource
exchange alliance reveal that the results can be summarized by 5 cases, as in Table 1.
Consumer surplus. To calculate the consumer surplus associated with demand model (10), it is instruc-
tive to start with a utility model that leads to demand model (10). Consider a representative consumer
who consumes z−1 units of the product sold by seller −1 and z1 units of the product sold by seller 1. Sup-
pose that the resulting utility is given by U(z−1, z1) := a−1z−1 + a1z1 − b−1z2−1/2 − b1z21/2 − cz−1z1 with
b−1, b1, b−1b1− c2 > 0. Given a price pi for the product sold by each seller i, the consumer chooses quantities
(z−1, z1) to maximize the consumer surplus U(z−1, z1)− p−1z−1− p1z1. It follows that the chosen quantities
satisfy
zi =
aib−i− a−ic
b−1b1− c2 −
b−i
b−1b1− c2 pi +
c
b−1b1− c2 p−i
This utility model leads to the demand model (10) if α = (aib−i − a−ic)/(b−1b1 − c2), β = bi/(b−1b1 − c2),
and γ = c/(b−1b1− c2) for i=±1, that is, if ai = α/(β−γ), bi = β/(β2−γ2), and c= γ/(β2−γ2) for i=±1.
In regions 1 and 2 in Table 1, the resulting consumer surplus is given by
U(bmin/2, bmin/2)− 2α− bmin
2(β− γ)
bmin
2
− 2α− bmin
2(β− γ)
bmin
2
=
b2min
4(β− γ)
In regions 3 and 4, the resulting consumer surplus is given by
U(αβ/(2β− γ), αβ/(2β− γ))− α
2β− γ
αβ
2β− γ −
α
2β− γ
αβ
2β− γ =
α2β2
(β− γ)(2β− γ)2
In region 5, the resulting consumer surplus is given by
U(α/2, α/2)− α
2(β− γ)
α
2
− α
2(β− γ)
α
2
=
α2
4(β− γ)
Thus, in region 1 all three settings have the same consumer surplus. In region 2, the consumer surplus
under perfect coordination and under the alliance are the same, and as shown in Section 3.2, both are larger
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than the consumer surplus under no alliance. To compare the consumer surplus under the alliance and under
no alliance in regions 3 and 4, note that
α2
9(β− γ) ≤
α2β2
(β− γ)(2β− γ)2
⇔ −4βγ+ γ2 ≤ 5β2
which holds since γ ∈ (−β,β), and thus in regions 3 and 4 the consumer surplus under the alliance is greater
than the consumer surplus under no alliance. To compare the consumer surplus under the alliance and under
perfect coordination in region 3, note that
b2min
4(β− γ) ≥
α2β2
(β− γ)(2β− γ)2
⇔ bmin ≥ 2αβ
2β− γ
and thus in region 3 the consumer surplus under perfect coordination is greater than the consumer surplus
under the alliance. To compare the consumer surplus under the alliance and under perfect coordination in
region 4, note that
α2
4(β− γ) ≥
α2β2
(β− γ)(2β− γ)2
⇔ (2β− γ)2 ≥ 4β2
which holds since γ ≤ 0 in region 4, and thus in region 4 the consumer surplus under perfect coordination
is greater than the consumer surplus under the alliance. Finally, in region 5 the consumer surplus under
perfect coordination and under the alliance are the same, and both are larger than the consumer surplus
under no alliance by a factor of 9/4. Note that, similar to total profit, the consumer surplus under perfect
coordination and under the alliance are the same except when capacity is large (bmin ≥ 2αβ/(2β − γ)) and
the sellers’ products are complements (γ ≤ 0).
Appendix A.4: Perfect Coordination with Product Differentiation
The model of perfect coordination introduced in Section 3.2 (with details given in Section 7) was based
on a model of demand d for the two-resource product given by d = max{0, α˜ − β˜(y˜−1 + y˜1)}, and the
model of an alliance introduced in Section 3.3 (with details given in Section 7) was based on a model of
demand di(yi, y−i) for the two-resource product of seller i given by di(yi, y−i) = max{0, α − βyi + γy−i},
where α˜= 2α+ 2(β− γ)(c−1 + c1) and β˜ = 2(β− γ). Thus, the model of perfect coordination in Section 3.2
does not make provision for different brands of the two-resource product, but the model of an alliance in
Section 3.3 makes provision for different brands of the two-resource product. In this section, we consider a
model of perfect coordination that makes provision for different brands of the two-resource product.
The demand di(yi, y−i) for the brand i product sold is given as follows:
di(yi, y−i) = α−βyi + γy−i
where as before yi denotes the excess of the price of the brand i product over the marginal cost c−1 + c1,
and we consider only values of (y−1, y1) such that α−βyi + γy−i ≥ 0 for i=±1.
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First consider the case in which the capacity is not constraining (it is determined later what amount of
capacity is sufficient for this condition to hold). In this case, the total profit is given by
g(y−1, y1) := y−1d−1(y−1, y1) + y1d1(y1, y−1) = α(y−1 + y1)−β(y2−1 + y21) + 2γy−1y1
Note that
∇g(y−1, y1) =
[
α− 2βy−1 + 2γy1
α− 2βy1 + 2γy−1
]
∇2g(y−1, y1) =
[−2β 2γ
2γ −2β
]
and thus ∇2g(y−1, y1) is negative definite (β > 0, β2− γ2 > 0), and hence g is a concave quadratic function.
Therefore, the prices that maximize the total profit are given by
y∗−1 = y
∗
1 =
α
2(β− γ) , (47)
and the corresponding total demand at the optimal prices is equal to α. Thus, if bmin ≥ α, then the total
profit of the two sellers under perfect coordination is given by α
2
2(β−γ) . Note that the optimal prices, demand,
profit, and consumer surplus are the same as for perfect coordination in Section 3.2 when bmin ≥ α.
Next consider the case in which bmin <α. First we consider price points (y−1, y1) such that d−1(y−1, y1) +
d1(y1, y−1) ≤ bmin, and then we consider price points (y−1, y1) such that d−1(y−1, y1) + d1(y1, y−1) ≥ bmin.
It follows from the results above for g that the point (yˇ−1, yˇ1) that maximizes g subject to the constraint
d−1(y−1, y1) + d1(y1, y−1)≤ bmin satisfies d−1(yˇ−1, yˇ1) + d1(yˇ1, yˇ−1) = bmin, that is, 2α− (β − γ)(yˇ−1 + yˇ1) =
bmin. Let
g1(y1) := g ([2α− bmin]/[β− γ]− y1, y1)
= α
2α− bmin
β− γ −β
(2α− bmin)2
(β− γ)2 + 2(β+ γ)
(
2α− bmin
β− γ − y1
)
y1
Note that g1 is a concave quadratic function with maximum at yˇ1 = (2α− bmin)/[2(β− γ)] (and thus yˇ−1 =
yˇ1 = (2α− bmin)/[2(β− γ)]).
Next consider price points (y−1, y1) such that d−1(y−1, y1) +d1(y1, y−1)≥ bmin, that is, 2α− (β−γ)(y−1 +
y1) ≥ bmin. The model should specify how capacity bmin is to be allocated between the two brands if
d−1(y−1, y1) + d1(y1, y−1)> bmin. There are various ways to allocate constrained capacity. Here we present
one such way, the equal rationing rule, in detail, and then we point out other ways that lead to the same
results. Under the equal rationing rule, if d−1(y−1, y1) + d1(y1, y−1)> bmin, then the same fraction λ of the
demands di(yi, y−i) for the different brands is satisfied, where
λ =
bmin
d−1(y−1, y1) + d1(y1, y−1)
=
bmin
2α− (β− γ)(y−1 + y1)
Then, the total profit is given by
g2(y−1, y1) = λy−1(α−βy−1 + γy1) +λy1(α−βy1 + γy−1)
= bmin
α(y−1 + y1)−β(y−1 + y1)2 + 2(β+ γ)y−1y1
2α− (β− γ)(y−1 + y1)
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Let y := y−1 + y1, and let
g3(y, y1) := g2(y− y1, y1)
= bmin
αy−βy2 + 2(β+ γ)yy1− 2(β+ γ)y21
2α− (β− γ)y
Recall that, in this case, 2α− (β− γ)(y−1 + y1)≥ bmin, and thus y≤ (2α− bmin)/(β− γ). First, consider any
fixed value of y ∈ [0, (2α− bmin)/(β − γ)], and maximize g3(y, ·) with respect to y1. Note that g3(y, ·) is a
concave quadratic function with maximum at yˆ1 = y/2 (and thus yˆ−1 = yˆ1 = y/2). Next, let
g4(y) := g2(y/2, y/2)
=
bmin
2
2αy+ γy2−βy2
2α− (β− γ)y
=
bmin
2
y
Note that the maximum of g4 over y ∈ [0, (2α− bmin)/(β − γ)] is attained at y = (2α− bmin)/(β − γ), and
thus yˆ−1 = yˆ1 = (2α− bmin)/[2(β− γ)]. Therefore, if bmin <α, then the optimal prices are
y∗−1 = y
∗
1 = yˇ−1 = yˇ1 = yˆ−1 = yˆ1 =
2α− bmin
2(β− γ) (48)
with corresponding total demand equal to bmin. Thus, the total profit under perfect coordination is equal to
(2α− bmin)bmin/[2(β− γ)]. Note that the optimal prices, demand, profit and consumer surplus are also the
same as for perfect coordination in Section 3.2 when bmin ≤ α.
Other rationing rules also lead to the same results. For example, suppose that the demand for brand −1
is satisfied first and then the remaining capacity, if any, is used for brand 1. In this case, the total profit is
given by
g5(y−1, y1) = y−1 min{bmin, α−βy−1 + γy1}+ y1 min{max{0, bmin− (α−βy−1 + γy1)}, α−βy1 + γy−1}
For this rationing rule the optimal prices are same as in (48).
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
In the problem (18), the objective value is bounded below by zero. It is known that a quadratic program
with a bounded objective value has an optimal solution. To establish uniqueness, consider the problem
min
(x,y)∈X
{
f(x, y) := xTQx+ aTx+ bTy
}
(49)
where X ⊂Rn1 ×Rn2 is a convex set and Q is an n1× n1 positive definite matrix. Let (x∗1, y∗1) and (x∗2, y∗2)
be two optimal solutions of (49). Consider the function φ(t) := f(tx∗1 + (1− t)x∗2, ty∗1 + (1− t)y∗2). Note that
φ is a quadratic function, φ(t) = αt2 + βt+ γ, where α = (x∗1 − x∗2)TQ(x∗1 − x∗2). Note that α ≥ 0 since Q
is positive definite, and thus φ is convex. Convexity of X and optimality of (x∗1, y∗1) and (x∗2, y∗2) implies
that φ(t) ≥ φ(0) = φ(1) for all t ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, convexity of φ implies that φ(t) ≤ φ(0) = φ(1) for all
t∈ [0,1]. Hence φ(t) = φ(0) = φ(1) for all t∈ [0,1], and thus α= 0. Since Q is positive definite it follows that
x∗1 = x
∗
2. Finally, if the optimal objective value of problem (18), and hence of problem (17), is zero, then
(y∗−1, y
∗
1, λ
∗
−1, λ
∗
1) satisfies the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions (16), and thus (y
∗
−1, y
∗
1) is the
Nash equilibrium.
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Appendix C: Details of Demand Transformation for No Alliance Model
The parameters E,B,C in demand model (11) and the parameters E˜, B˜, C˜ in demand model (20) should be
related in a particular way to facilitate a fair comparison of the prices, demands, total profit, and consumer
surplus between the settings with and without an alliance. In this section we derive the relation.
The relation between the demand models with and without an alliance is based on the assumption that
the overall demand level for each product is the same with and without an alliance. Recall that Li denotes
the set of products which can be offered by seller i with and without an alliance, for i=±1, and L0 denotes
the set of products which could be offered only under an alliance. In addition, let L0,i ⊂L0 denote the set of
products in L0 that can be offered by seller i under an alliance, and let Li,−i ⊂Li denote the set of products
in Li that can be offered by seller −i under an alliance, but not without an alliance. Thus, for the setting
with an alliance the number of demand equations (and prices) for each seller i is mi = |Li|+ |L0,i|+ |L−i,i|,
and for the setting without an alliance the number of demand equations (and prices) for each seller i is only
|Li|.
The following example is used to explain the derivation of the relation between the demand models.
Seller −1 produces resource A, and seller 1 produces resources B and C. With an alliance, the following
products are offered by each seller: Product A using 1 unit of resource A each, product B using 1 unit of
resource B each, product C using 1 unit of resource C each, product BC using 1 unit of resource B and
1 unit of resource C each, and product A2BC using 2 units of resource A, 1 unit of resource B, and 1 unit
of resource C each. Without an alliance, product A is offered by seller −1 only and seller −1 captures all
the demand for product A, and products B, C, and BC are offered by seller 1 only and seller 1 captures all
the demand for products B, C, and BC. Product A2BC is not offered by either seller, but there still is the
same demand for product A2BC; buyers buy each unit of product A2BC by buying 2 units of product A
from seller −1, and 1 unit of product BC from seller 1. As shown later, the demands for products A and BC
derived from the demand for product A2BC is added to the respective demands for products A and BC by
themselves. Note that this derivation assumes that buyers buy each unit of product A2BC by buying 1 unit
of product BC from seller 1 instead of buying 1 unit of product B and 1 unit of product C separately from
the same seller. This assumption may be questionable if the price of buying products B and C separately
is less than the price of product BC. In the numerical work, we verified that the prices of multiple resource
products offered by a seller were less than the sum of the prices of any products that could be bought
separately to make up the multiple resource product. Thus, in this example, L−1 = {A}, L1 = {B,C,BC},
L0,−1 = {A2BC}, L0,1 = {A2BC}, L−1,1 = {A}, and L1,−1 = {B,C,BC}. With an alliance, the demand for
each product is given by (11):
di,A = −Ei,A,Ayi,A−Ei,A,Byi,B −Ei,A,Cyi,C −Ei,A,BCyi,BC −Ei,A,A2BCyi,A2BC
+B−i,A,Ay−i,A +B−i,A,By−i,B +B−i,A,Cy−i,C +B−i,A,BCy−i,BC +B−i,A,A2BCy−i,A2BC +Ci,A
di,B = −Ei,B,Ayi,A−Ei,B,Byi,B −Ei,B,Cyi,C −Ei,B,BCyi,BC −Ei,B,A2BCyi,A2BC
+B−i,B,Ay−i,A +B−i,B,By−i,B +B−i,B,Cy−i,C +B−i,B,BCy−i,BC +B−i,B,A2BCy−i,A2BC +Ci,B
di,C = −Ei,C,Ayi,A−Ei,C,Byi,B −Ei,C,Cyi,C −Ei,C,BCyi,BC −Ei,C,A2BCyi,A2BC
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+B−i,C,Ay−i,A +B−i,C,By−i,B +B−i,C,Cy−i,C +B−i,C,BCy−i,BC +B−i,C,A2BCy−i,A2BC +Ci,C
di,BC = −Ei,BC,Ayi,A−Ei,BC,Byi,B −Ei,BC,Cyi,C −Ei,BC,BCyi,BC −Ei,BC,A2BCyi,A2BC
+B−i,BC,Ay−i,A +B−i,BC,By−i,B +B−i,BC,Cy−i,C +B−i,BC,BCy−i,BC
+B−i,BC,A2BCy−i,A2BC +Ci,BC
di,A2BC = −Ei,A2BC,Ayi,A−Ei,A2BC,Byi,B −Ei,A2BC,Cyi,C −Ei,A2BC,BCyi,BC −Ei,A2BC,A2BCyi,A2BC
+B−i,A2BC,Ay−i,A +B−i,A2BC,By−i,B +B−i,A2BC,Cy−i,C +B−i,A2BC,BCy−i,BC
+B−i,A2BC,A2BCy−i,A2BC +Ci,A2BC
To use these observations and the demand functions given by (11) for the alliance setting to derive
the demand functions for the products with no alliance, first note that the demands in (11) depend on
|L0,−1|+ |L0,1|+ |L−1|+ |L1|+ |L−1,1|+ |L1,−1| prices yi,`, but the demands in (20) depend on only |L−1|+ |L1|
prices. Thus, to derive the demands of the products with no alliance (as a function of the |L−1|+ |L1| prices y˜
with no alliance), it remains to determine appropriate values to substitute into (11) for the |L0,−1|+ |L0,1|+
|L−1|+ |L1|+ |L−1,1|+ |L1,−1| prices y given the prices y˜. First, consider the easy case: if a product ` is offered
by the same seller i in both the setting with an alliance and the setting without an alliance, that is, `∈Li,
then simply substitute price y˜i,` for yi,` in the demand model (11). Thus, in the example above, y˜−1,A, y˜1,B,
y˜1,C , and y˜1,BC are substituted for y−1,A, y1,B, y1,C , and y1,BC respectively. Next, if a product ` offered by a
seller i in the alliance setting is not offered by any seller in the no alliance setting, that is, `∈L0,i, but it can
be assembled in the no alliance setting by buying a−1 units of product `−1 from seller −1 and a1 units of
product `1 from seller 1, then substitute price a−1y˜−1,`−1 + a1y˜1,`1 for yi,` in the demand model (11). Thus,
in the example above, 2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC is substituted for y−1,A2BC and y1,A2BC . Next, if a product ` offered
by a seller i in the alliance setting is not offered by seller i in the no alliance setting, but it is offered by
seller −i in the no alliance setting, that is, `∈L−i,i), then we choose the price yi,` in the demand model (11)
so that together with the other prices yi′,`′ , i
′ =±1, `′ ∈ Li′ ∪L0,i′ , already determined as described above,
will equate di,` to zero. Note that if there are n such products, then n linear equations are obtained by
equating the n linear expressions for di,` to zero, and under reasonable conditions these equations can be
solved for the n desired values of yi,`. Thus, for the example above, the system of equations
−E1,A,Ay1,A−E1,A,B y˜1,B −E1,A,C y˜1,C −E1,A,BC y˜1,BC −E1,A,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC)
+B−1,A,Ay˜−1,A +B−1,A,By−1,B +B−1,A,Cy−1,C +B−1,A,BCy−1,BC +B−1,A,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC) +C1,A
= 0
−E−1,B,Ay˜−1,A−E−1,B,By−1,B −E−1,B,Cy−1,C −E−1,B,BCy−1,BC −E−1,B,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC)
+B1,B,Ay1,A +B1,B,B y˜1,B +B1,B,C y˜1,C +B1,B,BC y˜1,BC +B1,B,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC) +C−1,B
= 0
−E−1,C,Ay˜−1,A−E−1,C,By−1,B −E−1,C,Cy−1,C −E−1,C,BCy−1,BC −E−1,C,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC)
+B1,C,Ay1,A +B1,C,B y˜1,B +B1,C,C y˜1,C +B1,C,BC y˜1,BC +B1,C,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC) +C−1,C
= 0
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−E−1,BC,Ay˜−1,A−E−1,BC,By−1,B −E−1,BC,Cy−1,C −E−1,BC,BCy−1,BC −E−1,BC,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC)
+B1,BC,Ay1,A +B1,BC,B y˜1,B +B1,BC,C y˜1,C +B1,BC,BC y˜1,BC +B1,BC,A2BC(2y˜−1,A + y˜1,BC) +C−1,BC
= 0
is solved for y1,A, y−1,B, y−1,C , and y−1,BC as linear functions of y˜−1,A, y˜1,B, y˜1,C , and y˜1,BC .
To state the general relation between parameters E,B,C in demand model (11) and the parameters
E˜, B˜, C˜ in demand model (20) in general, we first develop the notation needed for a concise representation.
Let the rows and columns of matrix Ei be grouped so that the first group of rows and columns correspond to
products in Li, the second group of rows and columns correspond to products in L0,i, and the third group of
rows and columns correspond to products in L−i,i. Hence Ei can be partitioned into submatrices as follows:
Li L0,i L−i,i
Ei =
 Ei,i Ei,0,i Ei,−i,iE0,i,i E0,i,0,i E0,i,−i,i
E−i,i,i E−i,i,0,i E−i,i,−i,i
 LiL0,i
L−i,i
This grouping of the rows and columns of Ei implies that the rows and columns of di, yi, Bi, and Ci are
similarly grouped:
L−i L0,−i Li,−i
B−i =
 Bi,−i Bi,0,−i Bi,i,−iB0,i,−i B0,i,0,−i B0,i,i,−i
B−i,i,−i B−i,i,0,−i B−i,i,i,−i
 LiL0,i
L−i,i
, yi =
 yi,iyi,0,i
yi,−i,i
 , Ci =
 Ci,iCi,0,i
Ci,−i,i
 , di =
 di,idi,0,i
di,−i,i

Note that given the prices y˜ in the no alliance setting, the prices for the same products in the alliance setting
are yi,i = y˜i ∈R|Li|. Let Ri,i′,`,`′ denote the number of units of product `′ ∈Li′ used to assemble one unit of
product ` ∈ L0,i. Then, given the prices y˜ in the no alliance setting, the price paid to assemble one unit of
product `∈L0,i in the no alliance setting is∑
i′=±1
∑
`′∈Li′
Ri,i′,`,`′ y˜i′,`′
Let Ri,i′ ∈ R|L0,i|×|Li′ | denote the matrix with entry Ri,i′,`,`′ in the row corresponding to ` ∈ L0,i and the
column corresponding to `′ ∈ Li′ . Then, given the prices y˜ in the no alliance setting, the prices paid to
assemble each unit of product in L0,i is given by
yi,0,i =
∑
i′=±1
Ri,i′ y˜i′
Next, consider the demand for products in L−i,i.
di,−i,i = −E−i,i,iyi,i−E−i,i,0,iyi,0,i−E−i,i,−i,iyi,−i,i +B−i,i,−iy−i,−i +B−i,i,0,−iy−i,0,−i +B−i,i,i,−iy−i,i,−i +Ci,−i,i
= −E−i,i,iy˜i−E−i,i,0,i
∑
i′=±1
Ri,i′ y˜i′ −E−i,i,−i,iyi,−i,i
+B−i,i,−iy˜−i +B−i,i,0,−i
∑
i′=±1
R−i,i′ y˜i′ +B−i,i,i,−iy−i,i,−i +Ci,−i,i
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Then, given the prices y˜ in the no alliance setting, the value of (y−1,1,−1, y1,−1,1) is chosen to set
(d−1,1,−1, d1,−1,1) = 0. The system of equations (d−1,1,−1, d1,−1,1) = 0 can be written as −Dy−+F y˜+C− = 0,
where
y− :=
[
y−1,1,−1
y1,−1,1
]
, y˜ :=
[
y˜−1
y˜1
]
, C− :=
[
C−1,1,−1
C1,−1,1
]
, D :=
[
E1,−1,1,−1 −B1,−1,−1,1
−B−1,1,1,−1 E−1,1,−1,1
]
F :=
[−E1,−1,−1−E1,−1,0,−1R−1,−1 +B1,−1,0,1R1,−1 −E1,−1,0,−1R−1,1 +B1,−1,1 +B1,−1,0,1R1,1
−E−1,1,0,1R1,−1 +B−1,1,−1 +B−1,1,0,−1R−1,−1 −E−1,1,1−E−1,1,0,1R1,1 +B−1,1,0,−1R−1,1
]
Under reasonable conditions D is nonsingular (more specifically, positive definite), and then the unique
solution is y− =D−1F y˜+D−1C−. Let
L1,−1 L−1,1 L−1 L1
D−1 =
[
D−1−1,−1 D
−1
−1,1
D−11,−1 D
−1
1,1
]
L1,−1
L−1,1
, F =
[
F−1,−1 F−1,1
F1,−1 F1,1
]
L1,−1
L−1,1
Then
yi,−i,i = (D
−1
i,−iF−i,i +D
−1
i,i Fi,i)y˜i + (D
−1
i,−iF−i,−i +D
−1
i,i Fi,−i)y˜−i + (D
−1
i,−iC−i,i,−i +D
−1
i,i Ci,−i,i)
=
∑
i′=±1
( ∑
i′′=±1
D−1i,i′′Fi′′,i′ y˜i′ +D
−1
i,i′Ci′,−i′,i′
)
Next, the demand model (11) is used to derive the demand for each product `∈Li that is offered in the no
alliance setting:
di,` =
−∑
`′∈Li
Ei,`,`′yi,i,`′ −
∑
`′∈L0,i
Ei,`,`′yi,0,i,`′ −
∑
`′∈L−i,i
Ei,`,`′yi,−i,i,`′
+
∑
`′∈L−i
B−i,`,`′y−i,−i,`′ +
∑
`′∈L0,−i
B−i,`,`′y−i,0,−i,`′ +
∑
`′∈Li,−i
B−i,`,`′y−i,i,−i,`′ +Ci,`

+
∑
i′=±1
 ∑
`′∈L0,i′
Ri′,i,`′,`
− ∑
`′′∈Li′
Ei′,`′,`′′yi′,i′,`′′ −
∑
`′′∈L0,i′
Ei′,`′,`′′yi′,0,i′,`′′ −
∑
`′′∈L−i′,i′
Ei′,`′,`′′yi′,−i′,i′,`′′
+
∑
`′′∈L−i′
B−i′,`′,`′′y−i′,−i′,`′′ +
∑
`′′∈L0,−i′
B−i′,`′,`′′y−i′,0,−i′,`′′ +
∑
`′′∈Li′,−i′
B−i′,`′,`′′y−i′,i′,−i′,`′′ +Ci′,`′

The first term in brackets above corresponds to the demand for product `∈Li by itself, and the second term
in brackets corresponds to the demand for product ` to assemble products `′ ∈ L0,i′ , i′ = ±1. In terms of
matrix notation, the demands for the products in Li that are offered in the no alliance setting is given by
di,i = [−Ei,iyi,i−Ei,0,iyi,0,i−Ei,−i,iyi,−i,i +Bi,−iy−i,−i +Bi,0,−iy−i,0,−i +Bi,i,−iy−i,i,−i +Ci,i]
+
∑
i′=±1
[
RTi′,i (−E0,i′,i′yi′,i′ −E0,i′,0,i′yi′,0,i′ −E0,i′,−i′,i′yi′,−i′,i′
+B0,i′,−i′y−i′,−i′ +B0,i′,0,−i′y−i′,0,−i′ +B0,i′,i′,−i′y−i′,i′,−i′ +Ci′,0,i′)]
Next, replace yi,i, yi,0,i, and yi,−i,i with the expressions in terms of y˜ derived above. Then the demands d˜i
for the products in Li in the no alliance setting as a function of the prices y˜ in the no alliance setting are
obtained, as follows:
d˜i =
[
−Ei,iy˜i−Ei,0,i
∑
i′=±1
Ri,i′ y˜i′ −Ei,−i,i
∑
i′=±1
( ∑
i′′=±1
D−1i,i′′Fi′′,i′ y˜i′ +D
−1
i,i′Ci′,−i′,i′
)
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+Bi,−iy˜−i +Bi,0,−i
∑
i′=±1
R−i,i′ y˜i′ +Bi,i,−i
∑
i′=±1
( ∑
i′′=±1
D−1−i,i′′Fi′′,i′ y˜i′ +D
−1
−i,i′Ci′,−i′,i′
)
+Ci,i
]
+
∑
i′=±1
[
RTi′,i
(
−E0,i′,i′ y˜i′ −E0,i′,0,i′
∑
i′′=±1
Ri′,i′′ y˜i′′ −E0,i′,−i′,i′
∑
i′′=±1
( ∑
i′′′=±1
D−1i′,i′′′Fi′′′,i′′ y˜i′′ +D
−1
i′,i′′Ci′′,−i′′,i′′
)
+B0,i′,−i′ y˜−i′ +B0,i′,0,−i′
∑
i′′=±1
R−i′,i′′ y˜i′′
+B0,i′,i′,−i′
∑
i′′=±1
( ∑
i′′′=±1
D−1−i′,i′′′Fi′′′,i′′ y˜i′′ +D
−1
−i′,i′′Ci′′,−i′′,i′′
)
+Ci′,0,i′
)]
Note that the demands d˜i above are consistent with the demand model (20), for the following parameter
values:
E˜i = Ei,i +Ei,0,iRi,i +Ei,−i,i
∑
i′=±1
D−1i,i′Fi′,i−Bi,0,−iR−i,i−Bi,i,−i
∑
i′=±1
D−1−i,i′Fi′,i
+RTi,iE0,i,i−RT−i,iB0,−i,i
+
∑
i′=±1
RTi′,i
(
E0,i′,0,i′Ri′,i +E0,i′,−i′,i′
∑
i′′=±1
D−1i′,i′′Fi′′,i−B0,i′,0,−i′R−i′,i−B0,i′,i′,−i′
∑
i′′=±1
D−1−i′,i′′Fi′′,i
)
B˜−i = −Ei,0,iRi,−i−Ei,−i,i
∑
i′=±1
D−1i,i′Fi′,−i +Bi,−i +Bi,0,−iR−i,−i +Bi,i,−i
∑
i′=±1
D−1−i,i′Fi′,−i
−RT−i,iE0,−i,−i +RTi,iB0,i,−i
+
∑
i′=±1
RTi′,i
(
−E0,i′,0,i′Ri′,−i−E0,i′,−i′,i′
∑
i′′=±1
D−1i′,i′′Fi′′,−i +B0,i′,0,−i′R−i′,−i +B0,i′,i′,−i′
∑
i′′=±1
D−1−i′,i′′Fi′′,−i
)
C˜i = −Ei,−i,i
∑
i′=±1
D−1i,i′Ci′,−i′,i′ +Bi,i,−i
∑
i′=±1
D−1−i,i′Ci′,−i′,i′ +Ci,i
+
∑
i′=±1
RTi′,i
(
−E0,i′,−i′,i′
∑
i′′=±1
D−1i′,i′′Ci′′,−i′′,i′′ +B0,i′,i′,−i′
∑
i′′=±1
D−1−i′,i′′Ci′′,−i′′,i′′ +Ci′,0,i′
)
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 1
Consider any (a,A)∈A. Let ci = ei > 0, di =−eiai.
Consider the allocation problem (a′,A′) ∈ A given by a′i := ciai + di = 0 and A′ :=
{(c−1b−1 + d−1, c1b1 + d1)∈R2 : (b−1, b1)∈A}=
{
(b′−1, b
′
1) : 0 = a
′
i ≤ b′i, i=±1, b′−1 + b′1 ≤ g∗− e−1a−1− e1a1
}
.
Note that (a′,A′) is symmetric. It follows from the axioms of Pareto optimality and symmetry that
f−1(a′,A′) = f1(a′,A′) = (g∗− e−1a−1− e1a1)/2. Next it follows from the axiom of invariance under
positively homogeneous affine transformations that cifi(a,A) + di = fi(a
′,A′), that is, ei [fi(a,A)− ai] =
(g∗− e−1a−1− e1a1)/2.
